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THE CONDOMINIUM CRISIS:
A PROBLEM UNRESOLVED
CHRISTIA N C DA Y*
MARK I FOGEL**
I. INTRODUCTION
Condominium conversion became a major public issue during the
1970's.1 As economic growth declined, the amount of new housing
construction diminished, increasing the pressure for preserving low-
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania; B.A., Cornell University, 1967; J.D., New York University, 1970.
** B.A., Brandeis University, 1977; J.D., Washington University, 1981.
1. The increasing volume of studies, periodicals, and newspaper articles address-
ing condominium conversion, its roots and effects, demonstrates the growing public
concern over this issue. Particularly toward the end of the 1970's, critical attacks by
consumer advocates brought this issue to the forefront. See CITY OF Los ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA, RENT STABILIZATION STUDY (1979) [hereinafter cited as L.A. STUDY];
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ORG. OF SAN DIEGO REGION, RENT CONTROL AND
CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION STUDY (1979) [hereinafter cited as SAN DIEGO STUDY];
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, CONDOMINIUM Hous-
ING: A NEW HOMEOWNERSHIP ALTERNATIVE FOR METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON
(1976) [hereinafter cited as D.C. STUDY]; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, RE-
PORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION (1979) [hereinafter cited
as MONTGOMERY COUNTY STUDY]; PLANNING DEP'T, CITY OF PALO ALTO, CALI-
FORNIA, PALO ALTO CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION STUDY (1974) [hereinafter cited as
PALO ALTO STUDY]; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE CON-
VERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES (1980) [here-
inafter cited as 1980 HUD STUDY]; U.S DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY (1975) [hereinafter cited as
1975 HUD STUDY]. See also Soloway, Condos, Co-ops, and Conversions: A Guide on
Rental Conversionsfor Local OffiCals, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF PLANNING
AND RESEARCH (1979). For an overview of other publications concerning condomin-
ium conversion, see 1980 HUD STUDY, supra, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY.
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and moderate-income housing.2 In 1970, there were an estimated
85,000 condominium units in the continental United States. By
1980, there were close to 60,000 converted units in the Chicago met-
ropolitan area alone, with an incredible 32,000 units in the Lake
Shore Drive neighborhood.3 Numerous factors have caused this re-
cent movement toward the condominium form of housing. Conse-
quently, condominiums have had and continue to have a major
impact upon the American housing market. In fact, many predict
that condominiums will become the principal form of housing in the
United States within twenty years.'
One important form of condominium development is the "condo
conversion,"' involving the transformation of a rental building into a
number of individually owned housing units. Each condominium
purchaser becomes an owner of the apartment unit and a share of the
common grounds.' Condominium purchasers have, therefore, all the
legal advantages and disadvantages of real estate ownership.
The trend toward conversion has highlighted the existent problem
of an inadequate supply of rental housing. Condominium conver-
2. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY STUDY, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that be-
tween 1974 and 1979 there was only one privately produced multi-family housing
project built in the county); 2 1975 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at I-II (noting that
multiple-family rental housing starts have decreased).
3. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, App. I at 62-63.
4. 125 CONG. REc. H7346-47 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Rosen-
thal).
5. A condominium is a form of real estate ownership. In a condominium, the
purchaser obtains a complete fee simple title in his or her living unit within a larger
property (in the case of a conversion, in his or her building). In addition, the pur-
chaser acquires an undivided fee simple interest in the common areas of the building,
for example, the hallways, recreational facilities, parking areas, and the underlying
land. Each unit owner is, therefore, a tenant-in-common with the other unit owners,
See Rohan, The "Model Condominium Code"-4 Blueprintfor Modernizing Condo-
minium Legislation, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 587, 587 n.3 (1978).
This article will not expressly deal with cooperative conversions. A cooperative
also refers to building ownership by a non-profit corporation whose shareholders are
its residents. The shareholder-residents are actually tenants who lease their apart-
ments from the corporation. They purchase shares from the corporation which entitle
them to live in their particular apartments and use the common areas and facilities of
the building. They also pay a "rent," usually calculated on the basis of the size of
their respective units, to maintain the building. Cooperatives differ from condomini-
ums in that the corporation, not each individual unit owner, obtains a mortgage for
the property. [1978 Reference File 2] Hous. & Dav. Rr P. (BNA) 25:0011. See also
1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 1-5-6.
6. See note 5 supra.
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sions exacerbated this problem by consuming an increasingly sub-
stantial portion of that already limited market. Converters, both
single-building owners and condominium developers, took existing
multi-family rental units and altered them for individual apartment
ownership. Although this conversion process resulted in renewed in-
terest in the inner city, it also caused a problem: tenant displace-
ment.7 Many tenants, primarily the elderly and persons of low- and
moderate-income, were unable or unwilling to purchase their apart-
ments and suffered the hardships of unexpected relocation.8
Problems multiplied during governmental ambivilance9 as the dis-
7. Tenant displacement has been measured by the number of persons who do not
purchase their apartments after conversion. The tenant displacement issue is hotly
contested. Some question the significance of the high displacement rate.
A number of communities conducting studies of tenant displacement have found
that over 60% of the tenants formerly residing in a converted apartment building did
not purchase their units. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at IX-10-11. These
statistics become important when the community has a rental housing vacancy rate of
less than 5%. See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra See also Condominium Hous-
ing Issues: Hearings on S. 612 Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-53 (1979) (statement of Daniel Lauber).
8. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. H7348 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (noting the elderly,
the poor, and the young suffer the most adverse consequences from conversion); Rit-
ter, Condominium Conversions A City Attorney's View, 55 FLA. B.J. 94 (1981) (dis-
placement of elderly and low-income tenants through condominium conversions has
become a crisis in southern Florida because of the high retiree and Hispanic immi-
grant populations). See also MONTGOMERY COUNTY STUDY, supra note 1, at 47;
Comment, Conversion a/Apartments to Condominiums and Cooperatives: Protecting
Tenants in New York, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 705, 707-08 (1975).
9. Although conversions occurred throughout the 1970's, it was not until the latter
part of the decade that cities and states began enacting conversion regulations. Before
displacement problems became apparent, many cities solicited private restoration.
The cities provided substantial tax benefits and sold abandoned buildings at deflated
prices. As conversion pressures grew, they were reluctant to impair the rehabilitation
efforts of private developers. Consequently, there was substantial government indeci-
sion regarding regulation of conversions. See generally Comment, The Condominium
Conversion Problem: Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306.
The tension between the city's desire to encourage conversions and the need to
protect its tenants is clearly exemplified in the conversion ordinance of Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, BOSTON, MASS. ORDINANCE CODE ch. 4 § 200 (1979), which provides:
Preamble:
Whereas, A serious emergency exists with respect to the housing of a substan-
tial number of citizens of Boston; and
Whereas, The deterioration and demolition of existing housing and an insuffi-
cient supply of new housing have resulted in a substantial and critical shortage of
safe, decent, and reasonably priced rental housing accommodations; and
Whereas, Home ownership creates an interest in real estate which tends to
contribute to the maintenance and preservation of housing and to an increase in
1981]
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placed had difficulties finding and affording suitable replacement
housing. I" Unregulated, the developments in condominium conver-
sion compelled government action.
Government responses to condominium problems have occurred
primarily at the state and local levels." The main thrust of state con-
real estate taxes which has a salutary effect on the City and its people, and the
City Council should, therefore, encourage an increase in such ownership or at
least should avoid discouraging it; and
Whereas, Individual ownership of multiple unit housing accommodations of-
fers a number of advantages when compared to an unattached one-family house,
not the least of which is a considerable saving in energy used for heating, and the
City Council should, therefore, encourage an increase in such ownership or at
least should avoid discouraging it; and
Whereas, At present in the City there is a great interest in and a significant
amount of conversions of multiple unit rental housing occupied by tenants to
condominium units occupied by individual owners thereof; and
Whereas, Notwithstanding the general good accomplished by such increase in
home ownership, many people of limited means, particularly the elderly, are suf-
fering thereby in that they have difficulty in obtaining alternative rental housing
at prices which they can afford when evicted for condominium conversion; and
Whereas, The untoward effects of condominium conversion evictions on ten-
ants can be adequately dealt with by providing potentially displaced tenants with
sufficient time to examine the housing market, evaluate available housing alter-
natives, formulate future housing plans, secure any necessary financing and de-
cide whether to purchase the condominium unit or relocate; and
Whereas, This emergency cannot be dealt with solely by the operation of the
private rental housing market nor solely by Chapter 15 of the Ordinances of
1975, as amended, and unless evictions for condominium conversions are addi-
tionally regulated and controlled, such emergency and the inflationary pressures
and displacement resulting therefrom will produce serious threats to the public
health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of Boston;...
10. See note 7 supra.
11. For an examination of the various state and local responses and the issues
raised by these statutes and ordinances, see 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1; Katun,
Krantz, & Blinderman, Condominiums and Recent Legislative .4ction in Florida, 55
FLA. BJ. 148 (1981); Mursten, Florida's RegulatoryResponse to Condominium Conver-
sions: The Roth 4ct, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1077 (1980); Snyderman & Morrison,
Rental Market Protections Through the Conversion Moratorium: Legal Limits and41-
ternatives, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 973 (1980); Wynn, Condominium Conversion and Ten-
ant Rights-Wisconsin Statutes Section 703.08 What Kind of Frotection Does It Really
Provide? 63 MARQ. L. REv. 73 (1979); Note, Government Regulation of Condominium
Conversion, 8 B.C. ENv. AFF. L. REv. 919 (1980); Note, The Condominium Conversion
Problen Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306; Note, The Validity of Ordinances
Limiting Condominium Conversion, 78 MICH. L. Rnv. 124 (1979); Note, Condominium
Conversion Legislation: Limitation on Use or Deprivation of Rights?-A Re-examina-
tion, 15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 815 (1980); Note, Municoal Regulation of Conversion in
California, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1979); Note, Regulatory Responses to the Condo-
minium Conversion Crisis, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 513 (1981); Comment, Conversion of
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dominium legislation has focused upon consumer protection for the
purchaser. 2 Since few states specifically address tenant problems,
many municipalities have enacted ordinances providing tenant pro-
tection."3 The remedial focus of these statutes and ordinances, how-
ever, neglects the real objective: encouraging the development and
retention of sufficient rental housing. Present conversion legislation
has only mitigated the impact of conversion on tenants although, in
some cases, measures have been enacted that seek protection of the
existing rental housing stock by regulating or prohibiting conver-
sion. 14
Apartments to Condominiums" Social and Economic Regulations Under the California
Subdivision Map Act, 16 CAL. W. L. REv. 466 (1980); Comment, The Regulation of
RentalApartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507 (1980); Comment, The Le-
gality and Practicality of Condominium Conversion Moratoriums, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1199 (1980).
12. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-886 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 514A-1
to -108 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:54 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5311.26 (Anderson 1981); VA. CODE §§ 55-79.94 (Supp. 1980).
13. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at XII-4, which notes the following are
among the cities which have enacted some form of condominium conversion ordi-
nance:
In Arizona: Mesa;
in California: Chula Vista, Concord, Costa Mesa, Cupertino, Duarte,
Garden Grove, Gardena, La Mesa, Long Beach, Los
Angeles (city and county), Montclair, Mountain View,
Oakland, Oceanside, Palo Alto, Riverside, San Diego, San
Francisco, San Jose, and Walnut Creek;
in Colorado: Boulder and Denver,
in Connecticut: Glastonbury;
in Georgia: Atlanta;
in Illinois: Arlington Heights, Chicago, Evanston, and Skokie;
in Indiana: Indianapolis;
in Massachusetts: Boston, Brookline, and Cambridge;
in Minnesota: Minneapolis;
in Missouri: University City and Webster Groves;
in Ohio: Beachwood, Lakewood, and Lyndhurst;
in Pennsylvania: Philadelphia;
m Washington: Seattle.
Id See generally SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 1, at 64; Ritter, Condominium Con-
versions: Ci.y Attorney's View, 55 FLA. B.J. 94, 96 n.1 (1981).
14. See notes 140-208 and accompanying text infra.
1981]
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Many factors have contributed to the movement toward condo-
minium conversion. First and foremost, building owners and devel-
opers found they could reap huge profits by a successful conversion.IS
The usual conversion process begins with the developer-converter
buying out the landlord, who usually obtains a sizeable capital gain
on the sale. Next, the developer modifies the units for ownership and
then sells them to the public at inflated rates, making a huge profit for
his "efforts." Moreover, banks encourage conversions because they
stand to gain by lending more money at higher interest rates in the
fairly secure home mortgage market.
The second factor contributing to the condominium conversion
movement is that rental housing has become increasingly unprofita-
ble. 6 Third, tax laws affect the picture, as they inevitably do in all
areas of real estate. 7 The Internal Revenue Code discourages land-
lords from investing in, maintaining, improving, and even personally
disposing of rental housing.' 8 Conversely, the Code encourages con-
15. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. H7347 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (condominium con-
versions can be extremely profitable, with profits often ranging between 50 and 500
percent per conversion); Richardson, Profits on Conversion-Maximizing the Land-
lord'sAfter-Tax Return, 55 FLA. B.J. 121 (1981) (high profits associated with conver-
sion require special tax planning). See also 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at V-17-
19.
16. See notes 46-106 and accompanying text infra. See generally 1980 HUD
STUDY, supra note 1, at V-1; 1975 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at I-11. Both studies
have indicated that landlords are opting for conversion because of dramatically
higher operating costs for rental units. Increased fuel costs, higher expenditures for
other repairs and maintenance, and rents which have not kept up with escalating costs
have driven present landlords to convert and prevented developers from entering the
rental housing market. See also D.C. STUDY, supra note 1, at 32-35; Comment, The
Condominium Conversion Problen" Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306, 311-
12; Comment, The Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversion, 8 FORDHAM URD. L.J.
507, 507-08 (1980).
17. See notes 107-131 and accompanying text infra.
18. After the landlord has lost his tax shelter, an apartment building becomes a
considerably less attractive investment. The landlord must begin to pay taxes on the
income attributable to the property. Any money he adds to it, in terms of repairs and
maintenance, is only a non-deductible capital expenditure, providing no tax benefit.
I.R.C. § 167. Further, if the landlord decides to become a converter, in most circum-
stances he will be taxed on the profit as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 123 1(b)(1)(B). The
tax code will probably treat him as a dealer because he is holding property for sale in
the ordinary course of business. I.R.C. § 1221(1). See Lippmann, Income Tax Con-
siderations in Conversion of Residential Rental Buildings to Cooperative or Condomin-
ium Ownership, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVE
CONVERSIONS 235 (1979); Anderson & Cody, Tax Considerations of the Condominium
Sponsor and Purchaser 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 887 (1974); Holub, Condominium Con-
[Vol. 21:3
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version, sometimes by even permitting the landlord to convert his or-
dinary income into capital gains.19
Although the factors listed above have played an important role in
many conversions, recent developments in landlord-tenant law also
have had a significant impact. These developments have filled the
landlord's life with complications he or she never dreamed of when
entering the rental housing market. These changes in both the land-
lord's and the tenant's status have motivated landlords not only to get
out of the rental housing business, but to "go condo" as well.
This article will examine the legal developments that have pushed
owners toward conversion. It will also analyze the tax system that
makes condominium conversion possible for developers and ofttimes
attractive for the renter to become an owner. The article will then
examine the various governmental responses to the condominium
conversion crisis. The discussion will finally turn to the legal attacks
resulting from these new regulations concerning their impact upon
private property ownership.
II. BACKGROUND
Although their origin dates back hundreds of years, condominiums
were essentially unheard of in the United States until the 1960's.20
Condominiums are a form of real property ownership, whereby each
condominium owner holds a fee simple interest in his dwelling unit
within a building. In addition, each unit owner has an undivided
interest in the common areas and amenities, combining fees with the
version Capital Gains or Ordinary Income, 11 TAx ADVISOR 609 (1980); Miller, Can a
Straight Condominium Conversion Produce a Capital Gain? 54 J. TAX. 8 (1981). See
generally Kaster, Residential Co-ops and Condominium Development Projects and Con-
versions." Promoter's Tax Techniques, 38 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. § 13.1 (1980).
19. See Shapiro & Lemlach, Tax Planning the Condominium Conversion-An
Analysis of Capital Gain Potential, 1 J. REAL EST. TAX. 184 (1974). The authors rec-
ommend that the investor consider conveying the building to an "unrelated corpora-
tion" (a corporation in which the former building owner owns less than 80% of the
voting stock). Id at 186-87. Such a sale would trigger capital gains treatment. The
corporation (controlled by the conversion developer and the former owner) would
pay taxes on the ordinary income or the conversion, taxed at the lower corporate rate.
The developer would receive the ordinary income as compensation, while the owner
would already have received the desired capital gains treatment. See also note 117
infra.
20. See P. KEHoE, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS (1974), for a discussion
of the historical development of condominiums. See generally Berger, Condominiur-
Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987, 987-90 (1960).
19811
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
other unit owners for building maintenance.2' A condominium con-
version merely takes an existing rental structure and adapts it for unit
ownership. Generally, the conversion process occurs while rental
tenants still reside in the building, thereby providing continuous in-
come to the developers. 2 As the tenancies terminate, the developer
prepares the units for their ultimate sale and distribution.
When Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1961,23 it did not
anticipate condominium conversion problems. Congress, believing
that condominiums were a suitable alternative form of ownership,
promoted the concept under Section 234 of the Act.24 That section
attempted to extend to the apartment owner the same access to fed-
eral fimding that was available to the single-family homeowner.25
Smaller than houses, and therefore presumably more affordable, con-
dominiums promised many people an ideal alternative to owning a
house.26 Congress, promoting homeownership, invited states to pass
21. See Note, Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
639 (1975). This article describes each unit owner's common interest in the condo-
minium property as a "tenan[cy] in common in the structural parts and other facili-
ties." Id at 641. The article is also a good source for examining condominium
development in the United States.
22. See K. ROMNEY, CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT GUIDE (2d ed. Supp. 1980).
The author, in this practitioner's guide, recommends continuous operation of the
apartment building to aid financing the conversion. Id at § 10-44-47. There is an-
other motive underlying this piecemeal method of conversion: a hope of favorable
tenant response. Many developers attempt to persuade present tenants to buy their
units whenever possible because they are both the best natural market for condomin-
ium purchasers and the best advertisement for attracting others. See also Schwab,
Factors to be Considered, in CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSIONS,
supra, note 18, at 12.
23. National Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 104, 75 Stat. 160 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 to 1750(g) (1976)).
24. Id at § 1715y. That section made Federal Housing Authority mortgage in-
surance available to persons interested in purchasing condominiums. See generally
Berger, supra note 20.
25. [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1922, 1937.
26. See Merrill, Cooper, and Papell, An Overview of Calfornia Condominium
Law, 6 S.W. L. REv. 487 (1974); Quirk & Wein, Homeownershpfor the Poor: Tenant
Condominiumr, the Housing and Urban Development of 1968, and the Rockefeller Pro-
gram, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1969); Teaford, Homeownershopfor Low-Income
Families: The Condominium, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 243 (1970); Comment, Condomiiums
and the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act: Putting the Poor in Their Place, 43
S. CAL. L. REV. 307 (1970). Some commentators have suggested that condominiums
for the poor are a desirable alternative to present low-income rental housing. Private
landlord and government subsidized housing have failed to adequately provide for
low-income tenants, and the quantity and quality of such housing is deteriorating.
[Vol. 21:3
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enabling legislation permitting and encouraging condominium devel-
opment.
Following Congress' suggestion, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia enacted enabling statutes recognizing condominium own-
ership.27 These statutes, often referred to as "first generation" stat-
utes, simply established a registration requirement for the creation of
condominiums.2" Little thought was given to the implications of this
new type of ownership. The condominium concept lay dormant until
the early 1970's with the exception of a limited interest in resort and
luxury condominiums.29 As the economic picture changed, however,
urban condominium development emerged.
Condominium conversions became a desirable housing alternative
in mature urban centers and their neighboring suburbs because of the
scarcity of improvable land °
Further, urban renewal has deprived many low- and moderate-income persons of
their prior housing. Therefore, assisting low-income persons in the purchase of con-
dominiums would have the double benefit of providing home ownership for those
traditionally so deprived, and rehabilitating cities by giving everyone a special inter-
est in preserving the property.
27. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at XI-I; Rohan, supra note 5, at 586.
For a list of citations to state condominium statutes, see 1 A.P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN,
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE app. 9 (1979).
28. States such as Florida and Arizona first enacted "second generation" statutes.
These markets, known as second home markets, became subject to purchaser abuse.
Frequently, fly-by-night developers defrauded innocent buyers or sold them poor
quality buildings. The "second generation" was a response to such abuses. See 1975
HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at IV-16.
29. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at summary i. The summary notes that
the condominium phenomena is a product of the 1970's. 366,000 rental housing units
were converted between 1970 and 1979, with the bulk of those units being converted
in the 1977-1979 period. Id According to a recent government survey, an estimated
723,000 condominium units exist in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL HoUSING SURVEY, 1977,
pt. ACT 1. See also Note, Muniipal Regulation of Condominium Conversions in Cali-
fornia, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 225 (1979).
30. See D.C. STUDY, supra note 1, at 32-35; 1975 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at
IV-8-12. These studies note that increased costs in new housing, restrictions on new
construction, decreased profitability for investments in rental properties, and high de-
mand for condominiums are factors leading to conversion.
Some commentators suggest there are at least seven factors underlying the conver-
sion phenomenon: 1) scarcity of available land near and in cities; 2) increased con-
struction costs for new houses and condominiums; 3) changing life styles; 4) lower
cost of condominiums vis-a-vis houses; 5) tax benefits in homeownership; 6) desirabil-
ity of homeownership as an end in itself and as an investment; and 7) greater availa-
19811
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For cities, conversion provided numerous benefits. Through the
recycling of older rental properties, the conversion process provided a
form of urban renewal. Moreover, the change from tenancy to home-
ownership stabilized some neighborhoods. I Individual ownership
broadened the tax base as each unit was independently taxable, and
the value of the building as a whole increased. 2 For developers and
those interested in inner-city revitalization, conversion was desirable,
providing efficient, inexpensive, and marketable housing, especially
when compared with new construction.
For the building owner, profit was the fundamental reason for con-
version. He or she received greater immediate profit from the sale of
the building than was obtainable from operating it on a rental ba-
sis."3 Additionally, as the demand for homeownership rose from en-
try of the baby boom generation into the housing market, the
pressure to convert grew. ' The profit motive and the increased de-
bility of condominium financing. Snyderman & Morrison, supra note 11, at 974 n.6.
The authors also note four factors which induce landlords to sell out or convert: 1) a
quicker and more profitable yield on their investments; 2) loss of tax benefits; 3)
threats of disadvantageous legislation concerning rental housing; and 4) inflationary
pressures that have increased operating costs of rental buildings. Id
31. See, e.g., SHLAES & CO., CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION IN CHICAGO: FACTS
AND ISSUES 61-64 (1979), reprinted in ALI-ABA STUDY MATERIALS-LAND USE
LITIGATIONS 516-518 (1979) (noting that conversions have had the effect of stabilizing
some Chicago neighborhoods through slower resident turnover and higher building
maintenance). See also Rohan, supra note 5, at 599; Comment, The Condominium
Conversion Problem: Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306, 314-17.
32. Many critics of condominium conversion regulation have accepted the notion
that conversionsperse would increase local tax revenues. See sources cited in note 31
supra But see 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at VIII- I1 (noting that with some
exceptions conversions do not appear to generate substantial tax windfalls for local
jurisdictions). See also G. Longhini & D. Lauber, Tenant Protections from Condo-
miniums (1979) (unpublished issue paper for American Planning Association). The
authors noted that in some instances, conversions have a negative effect on the local
tax base. Id For instance, in Cook County, Illinois, the property tax base for an
apartment building with seven or more units is thirty-three percent. Id Single-fam-
ily and condominium units, however, are taxed at a base of sixteen percent. Id
Thus, it is not always clear that conversions will increase local property tax revenues.
33. For a discussion of the profitability of condominium conversion, see Wilson,
Profit Potential in Condominium Conversion, 4 REAL EST. REV. 62 (1974). See also
note 15 supra.
34. See National Ass'n of Realtors, The Conversion of Rental Apartments to
Condominium or Cooperative Ownership (1979) (Unpublished issues paper):
The increased demand for home ownership is being fueled by:
1) The coming-of-age of the post-World War II babies, who started to reach
home-buying age in the early 1970s. This surge of young households will
[Vol. 21:3
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mand for homeownership does not, however, entirely explain the
causes of condominium conversion.
In the last decade, numerous legal and economic factors have con-
tributed to the diminishing supply of private rental housing. Federal
tax laws, for example, have deterred retention of rental units by re-
ducing the depreciation available to the owner.35 Along with this loss
of a tax shelter, a recent amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
actively encourages owners to dispose of rental properties by provid-
ing them with favorable capital gains treatment.36 Additionally, the
economy has created maladies for the landlord. High interest rates
have prevented necessary refinancing. Costs of operation and main-
tenance have escalated more rapidly than either controlled or uncon-
trolled rent. Moreover, rent control or the threat of rent control has
lessened the owner's prospects for a desirable investment return.3 7
Faced with these problems, as well as increasing tenants' rights,3"
tenant militancy, and buildings depreciating in value, sellout has
been a rational choice for landlords.
Although condominium conversion does not diminish the housing
stock in a community, it reduces the amount of available rental hous-
ing.39 The effect of conversion on a community depends upon the
continue into the very late 1980's, and will continue to be accompanied by
later marriages and fewer children born later in life. The result is an explo-
sion of one- and two-person households;...
id at 1.
35. See I.R.C. § 167(J)(2)(5). See also notes 18-19 supra. For a more exhaustive
treatment of the tax issues, see notes 107-131 and accompanying text infra.
36. See notes 18-19 supra; notes 107-131 and accompanying text infra.
37. See, e.g., Utt, Rent Control History's Unlearned Lesson, 8 REAL EST. REv. 87
(1978). The author examines the history of rent control in New York City. The arti-
cle notes that from 1970 to 1975 operation costs for apartment building owners rose
fifty-six percent, while rental revenue increased by only thirty-six percent. Id at 85.
Further, the New York program, unlike some others, permitted owners to pass on tax
increases to tenants. Despite this benefit, the author illustrates that operating rental
housing is unprofitable, concluding that inflation will make matters even worse. Id
at 90. See also notes 90-103 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 55-89 and accompanying text infra.
39. By definition, the condominium conversion process, which alters the status of
rental units to ownership units, naturally reduces the supply of available rental units
and increases the supply of ownership units. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note
1, at 4 (noting that conversions have contributed to decreasing rental supply); C.
RHYNE, W. RHYNE, & P. ASCH, MUNICIPALITIES AND MULTIPLE RESIDENTIAL
HOUSING: CONDOMINIUMS AND RENT CONTROL 62 (1976) (stating that conversion
accelerates an already existing rental housing shortage).
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particular local situation. While developers were restricting conver-
sions to high-income rental units, relocation problems were minimal
because displaced tenants with high incomes have high mobility. As
developers shifted to moderate- and low-income rental buildings for
renovation and conversion, however, tenant displacement resulted.4
Most often, these conversions have forced the elderly and others on
fixed incomes and those with low incomes to relocate. These persons
generally cannot afford the sizeable down payment nor the increased
monthly payments required to purchase converted units which usu-
ally cost more than their rental counterparts. 4 1 Further, even when
these persons can afford a condominium, many have found neither
the condominium form of ownership nor their particular apartment
especially attractive. As the rate of conversion has increased, how-
ever, many tenants have resorted to purchasing, fearing constant re-
location.42 The pressure to purchase amplifies the acute shortage of
suitable replacement housing, as the increased demand has induced
more conversions. Absent regulation of conversions, the least mobile
and most affected have borne the burden of relocation.
Tenant displacement has thus emerged as a prevalent urban prob-
lem. In effect, the displacement problem consists of three factors: the
lack of comparable housing alternatives, the specific characteristics of
the displaced tenants, and the insufficient time and notice provided
40. See note 7 supra But see 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at VIII-36 (sug-
gesting that most conversions occur in economically viable neighborhoods, rather
than low- and middle-income neighborhoods).
41. See Note, Tenant Protections in Condominium Conversions: The New York Ex-
perience, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 978 (1974), for a discussion of one major conversion
market. See generally PALO ALTO STUDY, supra note 1, at 17; SAN DIEGO STUDY,
supra note 1, at 11. Both sources note certain consistencies. First, the homeowner-
unit purchaser generally earns a higher income than the renter. PALO ALTO STUDY,
supra note 1, at 1; SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 1, at 11, 55. Second, the costs of
conversion tend to appreciate the land value substantially, usually raising prices
above the lower- and moderate-income person's budget. PALO ALTO STUDY, supra
note 1, at 1; SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 1, at 49. See also Note, Government Regu-
lation of Condominium Conversion, 8 B.C. ENV'TL AFF. L. REV. 919, 926, 926 n.35
(1980). The displacement problem is particularly acute in Brookline, Massachusetts,
the town with the highest percentage of elderly in that state).
42. Implicit in the more aggressive tenant responses to conversion is that the tight
housing market drives many persons to buy in. The building industry is noting a
stronger tenant purchase rate, which it attributes to tenant desires for homeownership
benefits. The problem with that analysis is that it fails to consider the number of
persons who prefer renting for reasons of mobility. See generaly 1980 HUD STUDY,
supra note 1, at IX-8.
[Vol. 21:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/2
CONDOMINIUM CRISIS
for relocation. When the national rental housing vacancy level re-
cently fell to five percent, it alarmed many experts. That level, ac-
cording to housing analysts, signified the lowest level which will still
permit tenant mobility,43 and suggested a serious housing problem
was imminent. Many cities then experienced vacancy rates dramati-
cally lower than the five percent minimum.'
The sudden growth in conversion activity concerned many local
governments as they found some of their citizens displaced. Many
cities responded by enacting legislation to protect their tenant citi-
zens.4" In doing so, they and other policymakers have had to analyze
the causes of conversion. In the next section, this article will similarly
analyze the factors which have generated the boom of condominium
conversions.
III. STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS
A. Recent Developments in Landlord-Tenant Law
1. Historical Background of Landlord-Tenant Law
Until the mid-twentieth century, most states followed the tradi-
tional common law view of the landlord-tenant relationship.46 At
common law, the lease enabled one to occupy the real property of
another for a specified period of time. Courts did not consider the
lease a contract, rather it was a conveyance of real estate, subject only
to the law of real property.47 Under a lease at common law, a land-
lord and tenant owed very few duties to one another. Unless other-
wise agreed, the landlord's sole duty to the tenant was to allow him to
43. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL
PROBLEM THAT NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION 5 (1979); Condominium Housing Is-
sues, Hearings on S. 612 Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1979). See also Apartment Crunch Alters Manhattan
Living, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
44. See. e.g., Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 1, at 11 (indicating city vacancy
rate was below 3%); MONTGOMERY COUNqTY STUDY, supra note 1, at 2 (vacancy rate
in 1979 was 3.3%); PALO ALTO STUDY, supra note 1, at 17 (noting vacancy rate of
1.18% leads to reduced mobility within the community, limited range of housing
choice, and an increased burden on other communities to provide rental housing).
45. See notes 140-208 and accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 47-89 and accompanying text infra.
47. E.g, Bunner v. Spiegel, 116 Ohio St. 631, 157 N.E. 491 (1927). See generally I
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as LAW
OF PROPERTY]; 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 22111] [hereinafter cited
as POWELL].
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have "quiet enjoyment" of the leased property." Only a breach of
the "quiet enjoyment" covenant or a fraud committed by the land-
lord would permit the tenant to terminate the lease.4 9 Gradually,
leases favored landlords to an even greater extent, providing that the
landlord's duty to perform the lease covenants was conditioned upon
performance of the tenant's duties under the lease. Thus, for exam-
ple, a tenant's failure to pay rent would lead to eviction.50
It was not until the 1960's that courts began to interpret and en-
force leases as contracts.5 Courts struck down lease provisions that
waived supposedly unwaivable rights or were "unconscionable"
under contract law.52 They embraced a theory that the residential
lease was an adhesion contract, thereby construing all ambiguities in
the lease against the landlord. Furthermore, courts set aside many
duties and remedies stipulated in the lease as being contrary to con-
tract law or the Constitution. 3 Courts even went further, implying
48. See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: .4 Critical Evaluation of
the Past with Guidancefor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 227 (1969). The
original leaseholds were made to facilitate farming rather than provide residence.
Like other real estate transactions, they were subject to the doctrine of caveat enptor
or "let the buyer beware." Under this doctrine, the tenant was responsible for in-
specting the property to insure he or she received what was bargained for. Thus, after
the landlord delivered the property, the lease would stand, unless fraudulently made.
See generally, Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 189 (1968). See also Lesar,
The Landlord-Tenant Relationshp in Perspective: From Status to Contracts and Back
in 900 Yeats? 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 369 (1961).
49. See LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 47, at § 3.11.
50. The tenant could be evicted even if the landlord breached his or her cove-
nants. Id
51. See Lesar, supra note 48, at 375. Even before courts began to construe leases
as contracts, they protected tenants by enforcing housing codes. Housing codes,
which have existed since the early 1900's, offer a new residential tenant a means of
insuring himself or herself of adequate, standard housing. Traditionally, however,
housing code enforcement has been unsuccessful in providing tenants with adequate
housing. See generally Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement.. Sanction and
Remedies, 66 COLuM. L. REv. 1254 (1966); Rutzick & Hoffman, The New York Hous-
ing Court: Trial and Error in Housing Code Enforcement, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738
(1975). See also Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Dam-
agesfor Antic#iatory Breach and Interdependence of Covenants), 16 TEX. L. REv. 45
(1938).
52. E.g., Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 782-83 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976).
53. See, e.g., Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that dis-
traint for rent denies tenant due process of law under Fourteenth Amendment);
Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (strik-
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other duties or remedies as being part of the lease. 4 In general, the
legal climate changed. The tenant was placed in a more favorable
position, better protected, and armed with a legal opportunity to take
advantage of the landlord.
2. Landlord's and Tenant's Duties and Remedies
a. Implied Warranty of Habitability
Perhaps the most important revolution in landlord-tenant law has
been the development of the implied warranty of habitability."5 Pre-
viously, the century old doctrine of caveat emptor56 dominated the
landlord-tenant relationship. The landlord was not responsible for
defects in the dwelling which the tenant failed to discover before oc-
cupying it or which arose during tenancy. This doctrine does not
make sense under present housing conditions. A tenant usually does
not have the ability to determine whether an apartment for daily liv-
ing is free of defects nor the wherewithal to repair new defects upon
discovery. 7 Enforcement of the caveat emptor rule thus operates as
an unreasonable hardship upon the innocent, unprotected tenant.
ing down confession of judgment clause in lease as unconstitutional with respect to
tenants earning less than $10,000 per year).
54. See notes 55-89 and accompanying text infra.
55. The significance of the development of the implied warranty of habitability is
illustrated by the vast amount of scholarship on the subject. The following is a good,
but by no means extensive, list of articles on the subject: Cunningham, The New
Implied Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to
Status, 16 URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1979); Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remediesfor
Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Reform in the District of Columbia, 59 GEO.
L.J. 909 (1971); Hicks, The ContractualNature of RealProperty Leases, 24 BAYLOR L.
REv. 443 (1972); Lone, Implied Warranties ofHabitability and Fitnessfor Intended Use
in Urban Residential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 161 (1974); Note, Contract Princiles
and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U. L. REv. 24 (1970); Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants'
Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Ur-
ban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 849 (1971); Comment, Landlord and Tenant-In-
plied Warranty of Habitability--Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor,
20 DE PAUL L. REv. 955 (1971); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability. A4n
Inc pient Trend in the Law of Landlord and Tenant? 40 FORDHAM L. Rav. 123 (1971).
56. Caveat Emptor is loosely translated to mean "let the buyer beware." This
common law, judicially-created maxim states that a purchaser must investigate and
test that which he or she purchases. This hard rule has been mitigated by warranties,
strict liability, and consumer protection laws. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 202 (5th ed.
1979).
57. Modem apartments are much more complicated than their agrarian counter-
parts. The technical skill necessary is not available to the ordinary tenant. Thus, it
would be absurd to continue to require that a tenant inspect his apartment for techni-
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Under these circumstances and a public policy favoring adequate
housing, courts began to offset the inequities of caveat emptor by
reading an implied warranty of habitability into residential leases.
The difficulty with breaking the century old legal principle is evident
in Pines v. Perssion.58 There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared
that no general implied warranty of habitability could be construed
in connection with a lease. The court nevertheless found for the ten-
ants, holding that there was an implied warranty of habitability that
an apartment would comply with the local housing code.5 9 By using
the phrase "implied warranty of habitability" instead of just citing a
violation of the code, the Wisconsin court created a new area of law.
During the 1970's, the doctrine of the implied warranty of habita-
bility in residential leases gained wide acceptance by courts and state
legislatures.6 0 Through this warranty, courts imposed greater duties
on landlords to keep leased premises in good repair and in a habita-
ble condition.6 1
Increasingly, courts extended landlord liability beyond violations
of local housing codes. Landlords became responsible to their ten-
ants for latent and patent defects in leased apartments. 62 Under the
cal defects before occupying the premises. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.1, Comment 6 (1977).
58. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
59. Id at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
60. See Cunningham, supra note 55, at 7-8. The author notes that at least eleven
jurisdictions have judicially recognized the implied warranty of habitability, id at 8
n.14, and at least sixteen others have enacted statutes adopting the warranty. Id at 7
nn.9-1 1.
61. See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Javins held that the landlord had a duty to keep an
apartment in good repair, in compliance with local housing codes, and in a habitable
condition throughout the lease period. Id at 1077-80. The court also noted, analo-
gizing to the Uniform Commercial Code, that the warranty was contractual in nature
and not waivable. Id at 1075, 1079. See also Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970), where the court discussed this new implied warranty:
It is a mere matter of semantics whether we designate this covenant one "to re-
pair" or "of habitability and livability fitness." Actually it is a covenant that at
the inception of the lease, there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of
the premises for residential purposes because of faulty original construction or
deterioration from age or normal usage. And further it is a covenant that these
facilities will remain in usable condition during the entire term of the lease. In
performance of this covenant the landlord is required to maintain those facilities
in a condition which renders the property livable.
Id at 144, 265 A.2d at 529.
62. Early warranty cases recognized there was an implied warranty of habitability
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warranty, the tenant was required to notify the landlord of defects in
the premises. Thereafter, the landlord had a duty to make the neces-
sary repairs. Failure to repair entitled the tenant to pursue legal rem-
edies.' Further, many courts developed more flexible standards,
finding breaches of the implied warranty when the apartment was not
"habitable or fit for living."' Landlord liability was found even
though there were no technical violations of specific housing code
provisions. Some courts went even further, imposing an affirmative
duty on landlords to protect their tenants from foreseeable criminal
activity on the premises. 65 This recent extension of the implied war-
for defects existing at the beginning of the tenancy. E.g., Lund v. McArthur, 51 Ha-
waii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977).
Recently, courts have held landlords liable for latent and patent defects that become
apparent after the tenancy had already begun. Thus, courts and now legislatures
have imposed the duty to repair throughout the tenancy. See generaly Cunningham,
supra note 55, at 86-95. See also Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant
Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1976); Moskovitz, The Implied War-
ranty A New Doctrine Raining New Issues, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1444 (1974).
63. See, e.g., McKenna v. Begin, 325 N.E.2d 507 (Mass. App. 1975) (allowing
landlord time to cure the breach before tenant can pursue his remedies); cf. UNIFORM
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 4.103, .401 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
URLTA] (permitting landlord to make repairs before tenant may seek legal remedies,
but apparently allowing tenants damages for the defects). See also MODEL RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE §§ 2-205 to -207 (Tent. Draft 1969) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL CODE]. For a general discussion of URLTA and the MODEL CODE, see
Blumburg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Programfor Achieving Real Tenant Goals,
11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I (1976); Comment, Tenants' Rights and Remedies Under
Delaware's New Landlord-Tenant Code, 78 DICK. L. REV. 247 (1976).
64. Kline v. Bums, 11 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971). Courts and legisla-
tures have expanded the implied warranty doctrine beyond housing code violations.
In fact, many jurisdictions have made housing code violations the minimum standard
of habitability, imposing liability even where there has been no technical housing
code violation. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974) (en banc); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973). See also URLTA, supra note 63, at § 2-104. Still, courts require
that there must be some material defect which renders the premises unsafe, unsani-
tary, or inadequate because the landlord has failed to provide essential services.
Berzito v. Gambito, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
65. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scott v.
Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198
N.W.2d 409 (1972); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). See gen-
erally Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowner's Liability for
Failure to Protect Patronsfrom CriminalAttack, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 727 (1979); Henszey
& Weisman, What is the Landlord's Responsibilityfor CriminalActs Committed on the
Premises? 6 REAL EST. L.J. 104 (1977); Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsi-
bility for Tenant Security, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 275 (1971); Recent Development, 33
VAND. L. REv. 1493 (1980). Most jurisdictions still adhere to the traditional rule that
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ranty illustrates the onerous burdens befalling landlords of residen-
tial buildings.6
Concomitant with the increase in landlord duties, courts have pro-
vided tenants with greater rights and remedies. Reading lease agree-
ments as contracts, courts have given tenants access to contractual
remedies, expanding their opportunities to receive compensation for
injuries caused by defects.67 For instance, some courts have recog-
nized a repair and deduct remedy, which allows tenants to repair de-
fects and deduct the cost from rent.68 Other courts have permitted
rent withholding if the tenant reasonably believes the premises are
uninhabitable.69 Further, a third generally accepted remedy has
been rent abatement.7" This remedy reduces the rent owed by the
tenant to the actual rental value of the property in its defective condi-
tion. All of these remedies deprive the landlord of rental income.
Moreover, they all are affirmative defenses.7 Ironically, therefore,
the landlord owes no duty to his or her tenants to protect them from criminal acts
committed on the leased premises by third parties. Trice v. Chicago Housing Auth.,
14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973).
66. Another legal theory may also soon become more common in landlord-tenant
law: strict liability. Although thus far most courts have not applied this harsh doc-
trine (harsh for the landlord at least), e.g., Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123
N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div. 1973) af'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1
(1973), one court already has, Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 634
(1976). If strict liability becomes more readily accepted, the plight of the landlord
would become even more severe as he would be subject to liability for many things
which he could not anticipate. Consequently, his insurance and repair costs would
-rise, there would be even a greater propensity of litigation, and housing problems
would bexacerbated.
67. See notes 68-88 and accompanying text infra.
68. See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (providing that
tenant may repair and deduct the costs from rent if landlord fails to make repairs
after notification); Jackson v. Rivers, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1971) (allowing tenant to deduct for repair of toilet). See also URLTA, supra note 63,
at § 4-103.
69. This remedy differs from the repair and deduct remedy in that it requires the
landlord to make the repairs before he will receive the rent due. E.g., Green v. Supe-
rior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d
351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Rowe v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850
(1972). See generally Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitabilty in Pennsylvania, 15
DUQUESNE L. REv. 459, 488 (1977). See also URLTA, supra note 63, at § 4.105.
70. See generally Bruns, Rent Abatement: A4 Reasonable Remedyfor Aggrieved
Tenants, 2 SETON HALL L. REV. 357 (1971); Note, Retroactive Rent Abatement, 19
URBAN L. ANN. 161 (1980). See also Cunningham, supra note 55, at 113-26;
URLTA, supra note 63, at § 4-104(a).
71. See, e.g., Houston Realty Corp. v. Castro, 94 Misc. 2d 115, 118, 404 N.Y.S.2d
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the landlord must sue to recover withheld rent, expending money to
do so, and then face the possibility of not only losing the lawsuit but
also having to make costly repairs.
b. The Elimination of Landlord Protections
Many courts have added to the landlords' problems caused by de-
velopment of the implied warranty of habitability and its attendant
remedies. Consistent with their contractual view of leases, these
courts have examined and struck down statutory remedies, landlord
conduct, and lease clauses that have unreasonably benefited land-
lords or otherwise harmed tenants. They have curtailed such tradi-
tional landlord protections as distraint," retaliatory eviction,7 3 and
confessions of judgment.74
Distraint, otherwise known as distress for rent, was a statutory
remedy that allowed a landlord, upon his or her unilateral claim that
the tenant owed rent, to levy on property found in the tenant's prem-
ises.75 The underlying purpose of distraint statutes was to permit
landlords to quickly recoup their losses or mitigate damages. In
1972, a federal district court, in Gross v. Fox,7 6 struck down a dis-
traint statute as unconstitutional. Relying on Fuentes v. Shevin,77 the
court ruled that the statute denied the tenant due process because the
landlord could deprive him of property without a proper proceed-
796, 798 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1978) (noting that traditionally the implied warranty is
raised as an affirmative defense to eviction proceedings); Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa.
Super. Ct. 50, 54, 390 A.2d 240, 240-41 (1978) (stating that implied warranty is an
affirmative defense against landlord's action for possession for nonpayment of rent).
See generally Cunningham, supra note 55, at 98-126 (discussing the instances where
the warranty is an affirmative defense, but also noting that the tenant may vacate the
premises because of an implied warranty breach). See also Note, supra note 70, at
161 (retroactive rent abatement is an affirmative suit against landlord for breach of
implied warranty of habitability).
72. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text infra.
73. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
74. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text infra.
75. The distress for rent remedy was, in effect, a landlord's lien arising from its
common law analogue, the innkeeper's lien. Since, at common law, the innkeeper
was required to accommodate all guests, the law entitled him to restrain his guests'
belongings until all bills were paid. N. COURNOYER, INTRODUCTION TO HOTEL AND
RESTAURANT LAw 7 (1968).
76. 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
77. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding Pennsylvania statute authorizing replevin by sum-
mary exparte proceeding violates due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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ing.7 8
Other landlord protections have met similar fates. Both courts and
legislatures have denounced the landlord conduct known as retalia-
tory eviction.79 Retaliatory eviction was an action permitting a land-
lord to deny a tenant a lease renewal or even to attempt an eviction in
order to punish the tenant for exercising a legal right."0 Frequently,
retaliatory actions arose when a tenant would report housing code
violations8 ' or other breaches of duty by the landlord to authorities. 2
The retaliatory action would rid the landlord of a troublemaker and
discourage other tenants from making similar complaints. To pre-
vent such conduct on the part of landlords, many state courts and/or
legislatures have precluded retaliatory use of the landlord's right to
terminate periodic tenancies by notice without cause.8"
With the emergence of tenant rights, even lease provisions became
subject to close judicial scrutiny. One provision, the confession of
judgment clause,84 was struck down as a denial of due process by the
78. 349 F. Supp. at 1168. Although the court recognized that distraint only de-
prived the tenant of property temporarily, he or she nevertheless suffered the depriva-
tion without a proper proceeding. The court found that a trespass action for damages
did not provide sufficient relief because the civil action would, as a practical matter,
take considerable time. Id
79. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that land-
lord action which prevented lease renewal because tenant reported housing code vio-
lation was unconstitutional); URLTA, supra note 63, at § 5.101 (providing that
landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent, decreasing services, or threatening ac-
tion for possession if tenant complains to a government agency concerning possible
housing code violations, complains to the landlord regarding breaches of warranty, or
forms or joins a tenant organization). See also MODEL CODE, supra note 73, at § 2-
407 (providing similar protection to URLTA, but in a more even balance between
landlord and tenant). For a list of the jurisdictions providing statutory protection
against retaliation eviction, see Cunningham, supra note 55, at 7 nn.10- 11, 131 n.581.
80. See Cunningham, supra note 55, at 126.
81. E.g., Edwards v. Habib 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dickhut v. Norton, 45
Wis. 2d 389, 175 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
82. See, e.g., Note, Retaliatory Eviction Protection in New York-Unraveling Sec-
tion 2236, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 861 (1980) (generally discussing the retaliatory evic-
tion problem).
83. See note 79 supra.
84. Also known as the cognovit judgment clause, a confession ofjudgment is writ-
ten authority by the debtor to direct judgment against him if he defaults on his pay-
ment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (5th ed. 1979). When inserted in a lease,
the clause permitted the landlord to appear before court, upon non-payment of rent,
and conferred judgment against the debtor. The clause directly conflicts with such
tenant protection as rent withholding provisions. Thus, confessions of judgment have
been abolished in most jurisdictions. See generally Note, Confession on Judgment, 102
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United States Supreme Court in Swarb v. Lennox.8 5 Before Swarb,
landlords commonly inserted confession of judgment clauses into
leases in order to prevent default by the tenant.8 6 The clause's pur-
pose was to insure that the tenant would not forego payment of rent.
Most often low-income persons found such clauses in their leases.87
The Supreme Court noted the leases were essentially adhesion con-
tracts because of the unfair bargaining position between the parties.88
It thus found the confession of judgment clause unconstitutional for
persons earning less than $10,000 per year.89
The shift in landlord-tenant law dramatically illustrates why many
landlords have opted for conversion and why many builders have
avoided new rental housing construction. Still, the shift toward ten-
ants' rights alone does not account for conversions. If rental housing
was profitable enough, surely landlords and builders would with-
stand these changes in the law. While these changes have affected
profitability, rent control has also had a substantial effect upon it and
has provided impetus for conversions.
3. Rent Control
Municipalities first imposed rent controls in the United States fol-
lowing World War I, in response to the severe housing shortage
caused by the war."° Although most controls terminated during the
U. PA. L. REv. 524 (1954). See also Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Prob-
lem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (1961).
85. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
86. See Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1094-95 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd, 405 U.S.
191 (1972); Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of Developing Law,
1969 DUKE L.J. 399, 471. See also Note, Standard Form Leases in Wisconsin, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 583, 590.
87. See Schoshinski, supra note 86, at 471.
88. 405 U.S. at 201.
89. Id at 199-202. The court noted that its decision was a very narrow one. Id at
201.
90. Rent controls were enacted as emergency measures with a temporary dura-
tion. Landlords, who suffered directly from these government regulations, immedi-
ately sought to have them overturned. In the earliest challenges, Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921) and Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921), the United
States Supreme Court upheld rent control ordinances. In Block, the court upheld a
due process challenge to a statute which extended an expired lease and established a
commission to set fair rent, finding that the rental was "clothed... with public inter-
est so great [as] to justify regulation by law." 256 U.S. at 155. Maarcus Brown, on the
other hand, was an equal protection challenge due to discrimination between residen-
tial and business rentals under the rent control statute. The court upheld the distinc-
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1920's, rent controls were reinstated during the Second World War.91
These rent controls were considered only temporary measures
adopted in response to war-created housing crises. Courts upheld
them, but only as "emergency" measures.92 They clearly warned that
under ordinary circumstances such measures would be unlawful. 93
After World War II, most areas repealed their rent controls. Until
1968, New York was the only state to continue both state and local
rent controls.94 Since that year, tenants, particularly in the northeast,
have pressed for rent controls.9 5 Many of the proponents have been
middle-class renters outraged by their rents. Massachusetts and New
Jersey followed New York and enacted non-emergency rent control
legislation.96 Washington, D.C., Miami Beach, Florida and numer-
tion, noting "the classification was too obviously justified to need explanation. .. ."
256 U.S. at 199. For a general overview of the history of rent control, see M. LETr,
RENT CONTROL: CONCEPTS, REALITIES, AND MECHANISMS (1976); C. RHYNE, W.
RHYNE, AND P. ASCII, MUNICIPALITIES AND MULTIPLE RESIDENT HOUSING: CON-
DOMINIUMS AND RENT CONTROL (1976); Barr, Rent Control in the 1970"'." The Case of
the New Jersey Tenants' Movement, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1977).
91. See 56 Stat 23, 50 U.S.C. App. § 924 (1942). See generally LETT, s pra note
90. See-also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller, 333 U.S. 138, 142 n.6 (1948); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Willis, State Rent Control Legislation, 1946-1947, 57
YALE L.J. 351 (1948).
92. See note 90 supr See also Note, Rent Control and Landlords' Property
Rights: The Reasonable Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 165, 170-77(1980).
93. The emergency doctrine has probably been abandoned for all intents and pur-
poses. Two recent decisions by the highest courts of Maryland and California have
upheld rent control ordinances without the emergency requirement. See Birkenfeld
v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001 (1976); Westchester West No. 2 Ltd.
Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2d 856 (1976). See generally
Barr & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process-The Housing
Emergency Requirementfor Rent Control, 7 URB. LAW 447 (1975).
94. See Barr, supra note 90, at 634-35, noting that until 1969, all rent controls
were limited to periods of war-related housing problems. In addition, the author
states that only New York City has retained rent control after the Second World War,
although a few states retained such controls into the 1950's. See, e.g., Teeval v. Stem,
301 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E.2d 884 (1950) (challenging the validity of the New York State
rent controls); Wagner v. City of Newark, 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957) (challeng-
ing the validity of a rent control ordinance); Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 387 Pa.
362, 127 A.2d 703 (1956) (challenging another rent control ordinance). See also
Comment, ResidentialRent Controlin New York City, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 30
(1967).
95. See Baar, supra note 90, at 636.
96. Massachusetts' early effort at rent control, ch. 797, Mass. Acts of 1969, merely
authorized the City of Boston to enact rent controls. Id One year later, however, the
state legislature provided enabling legislation for rent control throughout Massachu-
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ous cities in California are among the municipalities that enacted
rent control ordinances absent state legislation.97 Although a count
of these jurisdictions indicates that rent control is not widespread, it
continues to loom as a possible response to spiraling inflation and the
continuing housing crisis. The decline of low- and moderate-income
housing has increased the demand and fueled the clamor for con-
trols.98
Rent controls operate as a hardship on landlords. Regulating rent
increases, they deny landlords the opportunity to realize the full eco-
nomic potential of their investments. 9 Concurrent with rent control,
many landlords have experienced operating costs that have climbed
setts. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, 1970 Mass. Acts 732, reprinted in MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 40 app. at 249 (West Supp. 1979). The statute, which was to expire on
April 1, 1975, was extended by the Act of June 13, 1974, ch. 360, 1974 Mass. Acts 237,
and the Act of Dec. 31, 1975, ch. 851, 1975 Mass. Acts 1233, until April 1, 1976.
In New Jersey, on the other hand, the state did not enact a general rent control
statute. Rather, New Jersey municipalities have regulated rents under their broad
home rule powers since 1973 when the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that those
powers would sustain rent control ordinances. See Inganamort v. Borough of Fort
Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973). For review of New Jersey municipal rent
controls through 1976, see Baar, supra note 90.
97. In 1973, Congress authorized the District of Columbia to enact rent control.
District of Columbia Rent Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-157, 87 Stat. 624
(1973). Thereafter, the District City Council adopted rent controls by regulation. 21
D.C. Reg. 289 (1974).
The City of Miami Beach adopted a rent control ordinance in 1969. This ordi-
nance, MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE 69-1791 (October, 1969), was not acted pur-
suant to any state authorization. It was struck down in Miami Beach v. Fleetwood
Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
Aside from Miami Beach and Washington, D.C., several cities in Maryland, in-
cluding Baltimore, and such cities as Los Angeles, Davis, Berkeley, San Jose, El
Monte, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills and Santa Barbara, California have initiated ei-
ther rent controls or rent freezes in the middle and late 1970's. See SAN DIEGO
STUDY, supra note 1, at 28, 43-45.
98. See W. Keating, Rent Control as a Response to the Rental Housing Crisis:
Policy Alternatives for California 1-3 (Draft March 1980) (unpublished article sub-
mitted to American Planning Association; available on file at Urban Law Annual).
See generally, Goldwitz, Preparing for the Possibility of National Rent Controls, 13
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 268 (1979).
99. During the 1960's, operating costs in New York City outstripped revenues.
Studies of rent controls showed a large gap between revenues and costs, and recom-
mended that existing rent controls be scrapped. G. STERNLIEB, THE URBAN HOUS-
ING DILEMMA, THE DYNAMICS OF NEW YORK CITY'S RENT CONTROLLED HOUSING
(1976). See generally LETT, supra note 90, at 180-196; 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note
1, at V- 15; Harter, Rent Controls Forcing Condo Conversions Inflation Pushes Rents
Higher, 39 MORTGAGE BANKER, at 46-52 (July, 1979); Utt, supra note 37, at 90.
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dramatically, without receiving corresponding rent increases. t00 As a
result, they have found not only that their profits have dropped, but
also that they are, in fact, losing money. The New York City experi-
ence exemplifies this dilemma as many rent control landlords skimp
on building maintenance, default on local property taxes, and ulti-
mately abandon their buildings rather than trying to salvage their
investment."°
In light of housing crises and the effects of rent control, many land-
lords have feared that massive rent regulation proposals may be en-
acted under the guise of consumer protection. To avoid this, they
have considered conversion."°2 Although the spectre of rent control
may not be the major motivating factor behind conversion activities,
landlords' gloom brought on by the prospect of control cannot be
ignored as one factor in the decision to convert and escape the rental
housing market. 10
3
100. See, e.g., 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at V-14 n.17 (noting that since
1967, fuel costs rose 350% and utility costs 179%, yet residential rents rose only 79%);
G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, AMERICA'S HOUSING: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 269-
70 (1980) (between 1970 and 1977, overall consumer price index rose by 65.2% while
rents rose only 39.4%); Utt, supra note 37, at 89 (citing a New York City Housing and
Development Administration report, the author notes that between 1970 and 1975
operating costs of controlled units increased by 56.3% while rents increased by only
35.6%).
It is important to note that even without rent control, rental housing is encountering
similar problems. Thus, it is not surprising that some of the major cities that have
experienced substantial conversion activity; for example, Chicago, Illinois, Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, and Houston, Texas, are not rent control cities. 1980 HUD
STUDY, supra note 1, at V-16.
101. See, e.g., 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 1-12 (as of early 1980, at least
390,000 buildings have been abandoned in New York City alone); See generally,
Sternlieb, Bulldozer Renewal, 25 J. HOUSING 180 (1968); NATIONAL ASS'N OF REAL-
TORS, RENT CONTROL: A NON-SOLUTION 38-39 (1977) (between 1965 and 1975 New
York City lost approximately 200,000 buildings to abandonment, with rent control
clearly a, if not the, major factor).
102. A choice by the landlord to convert is a rational one. As the benefits of
remaining in rental housing diminish, it is often foolhardy for the private landlord to
remain in the market. One commentator has suggested that rental housing has taken
on the characteristics of a public utility. See Berger, .4 Public Utility View of Rental
Housing, 50 PA. B.A.Q. 234 (1979). Limitations on profit-making, quality restrictions,
and constantly greater tenant strength provide strong incentives for the landlord to
convert. Id at 240.
103. See generally 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at V-1-32. See also Camp,
Condominium Eligibiliy Soaring, Washington Post, Mar. 2, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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4. Implications
Rental housing is not the desirable investment it previously was.
In the past twenty years, courts have advanced the theory that the
residential lease is a contract, resulting in whirlwind changes in the
rights and remedies of both tenants and landlords.' °4 Many state leg-
islatures also have acted to strike a new balance of power between the
conflicting parties.' 5 Under such legislation, tenants have vastly
greater rights and remedies than were ever previously ascribed to
them. These changes have left landlords in a position they did not
anticipate when buying into the rental housing market. Moreover,
the spectre of rent control clouds the prospects for landlords even
more. 106 Thus, the landlord, troubled by difficult legal constraints
and high costs, may view conversion as a profitable way to dispose of
his rental units, especially given the favorable tax treatment he may
receive.
B. Federal Income Tax Factors that Promote Conversions
As previously suggested, the impetus for conversions derives from
the tight housing market, especially in rental units. Much of the
blame for this may be laid directly at the feet of the federal govern-
ment.10 7 The government's housingl0  and tax policies' °9 have
104. See notes 51-89 and accompanying text supra.
105. See sources cited at note 63 supra.
106. See note 94 supra.
107. See notes 108-09 infra.
108. Much of the decline of multi-unit rental properties can be attributed directly
to federal housing policies. After the Second World War, the Federal Government
initiated the Federal Home Administration (FHA) and Veteran's Administration
(VA) housing programs. These programs, supervised by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, made construction financing so much easier, in some instances by subsi-
dizing developments, that investors shifted their attention away from cities toward the
suburbs. See M. MAYER, THE BUILDERS 112-13, 336 (1978); J. JACOBS, THE DEATH
AND LIFE OF AMERICAN CITrEs 295, 308 (1961). See also C. STOKES & E. FISHER,
HOUSING MARKET PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 6-13 (1976). Although
some housing was developed, the goals anticipated under the Housing Act of 1949, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1436 (1976), were not met even twenty years after the passage of the
Act. J. FRIED, HOUSING CRISIS 60 (1971). See also Symposium, Housingfor the Ur-
ban Community, 39 GEO. W. L. Rv. 657-899 (1971); Symposium, Urban Housing and
Redevelopment, 21 ST. L. L. REv. 595-882 (1977).
109. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A4 Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970).
The author notes that the Internal Revenue Code is filled with numerous tax incen-
tives designed to stimulate certain investments and encourage desired activities, in-
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played critical roles in the housing crisis.
In a nutshell, Congress' federal income tax policies have promoted
housing construction through the creation of tax shelters." 0 While
housing has been created, these same shelters often have encouraged
rapid turnover of properties from taxpayer to taxpayer, resulting in
little continuity of ownership.' With little interest in long-term
ownership, most property owners rarely have used their depreciation
benefits to make necessary capital repairs on their buildings.112 As a
consequence, many buildings have deteriorated, receiving little or no
maintenance, and landlords have ultimately abandoned them.
13
The resulting reduction in housing stock has forced many urban ten-
ants, living in tight housing markets, to consider the possibility of
condominium ownership to insure themselves adequate housing.
14
When a landlord chooses to sell an apartment building or personally
convert it, he or she is responding as much to the tax consequences of
this decision as to the difficulties in operating rental housing."-
Many landlords, like other real estate investors, turn over their prop-
erty when it has lost tax shelter benefits."I6 Once depreciation and
cluding housing. Id at 705, 711. See generally H. AARON, SHELTERS AND SUBSIDIES:
WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES (1972); Shoenfeld & Sternberg,
"The Federal Income Tax Relationship to Housing:" A Commentary, 24 TAX LAW.
347 (1971). See also Note, Tax Reform and Real Estate Tax Shelters: Consequences
for Low-Income Housing, 48 U. CINN. L. REV. 99 (1979); Federal Tax Policy and
Urban Developoment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the City of the House Comm.
on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
110. For a general overview of the use of tax shelters to promote housing con-
struction, see Tucker, Real Estate Depreciation: 4 Fresh Examination of the Basic
Rules, 6 J. REAL EST. TAX. 101, 124-31 (1979); Weidner, Realty Shelters: Nonrecourse
Financing Tax Reform, and Profit Purpose, 32 S.W. L.J. 711 (1978); Weisner, Tax
Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of the Tax ReformAct of 1976, 33 TAX L. REV. 5
(1978).
111. See Shoenfeld & Sternberg, supra note 109, at 349.
112. Id at 350.
113. See note 101 supra See also Comment, Tenant Protection in Condominium
Conversions: The New York Experience, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 978, 991 n.72 (1974).
114. See note 42 supra.
115. See notes 17-19supra. Aside from the negative tax consequences of 1976 tax
reforms, such as lost tax shelters, the building owner benefits indirectly from other tax
consequences. Specifically, the building owner benefits from tax laws that encourage
homeownership by individuals. See generally notes 118, 123-124 and accompanying
text infra.
116. Income is sheltered, in large part, because of the investor's ability to take
depreciation on the capital asset, the real estate and the fixtures. I.R.C. § 167. Addi-
tionally, the investor-landowner may also receive certain tax credits for certain new
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interest deductions have reached the cross-over point,l l7 the expenses
and losses associated with the premises are not sufficient to shelter
income from that project or other sources. No longer profitable, the
time is ripe to sell the investment and reap long-term capital gains." I
assets when they are placed into service. I.R.C. §§ 7, 8. See also note 345 infra. The
depreciation, which is often seen as an artificial loss to the taxpayer (because he does
not incur any out-of-pocket expenses), is subtracted from the taxpayer's iucome, while
the tax credit permits subtraction of the credit amount directly fron, the calculated
tax.
When a taxpayer sells real estate, he generally can reap a capital gain. To the
extent that some of the gain is represented by depreciation taken that resulted in a
lower adjusted basis the taxpayer has converted ordinary income into long-term capi-
tal gain. For example, if Mr. Burgher invested $40,000.00 in a single-family dwelling
and rented it to a professional couple he is entitled to take $1,000.00 of depreciation
per year using the straight line method. I.R.C. § 167(b)(1). If he is in the 50% brack-
et, that $1,000.00 produces a tax benefit of $500.00, that is, Mr. Burgher can offset
$500.00 of income from other sources. If Mr. Burgher sold the house after ten years
for $50,000.00 his adjusted basis was reduced by $10,000.00 (ten years' depreciation).
I.R.C. § 1001(a)(2)(b). His gain is $20,000.00, as gain equals sales price $50,000.00
minus adjusted basis [$40,000.00 (the original sale price)-$ 10,000.00 (the depreciation
to him)]. I.R.C. § 1001(a). Because he is an investor he receives capital gains treat-
ment. I.R.C. § 1221. Note that the depreciation, taken earlier to shelter income, now
transforms into a capital gain. Real estate investors who use the straight line method
depreciation for their assets are able to do this. LR.C. § 1250. All other capital assets
experience the recapture of depreciation taken at ordinary income rates. I.R.C.
§ 1245.
Thus real estate investments are twice blessed by the depreciation allowance as the
owners may use depreciation to offset current income and may transform deprecia-
tion loss adjustments to basis to long-term capital gain that will shelter even more
income.
117. The cross-over point is the point in time when the taxpayer's income, from
both his realty and other sources, no longer receives adequate protection from the tax
shelter and thus he suffers tax liability for this ordinary income. The principal com-
ponents of the tax shelter are often interest deductions (I.R.C. § 163(a)) and deprecia-
tion (I.R.C. § 167). During the early years of the project the interest deduction is
great because of the employment of the self-amortizing loan. As the project grows
older the interest payment shrinks. Often accelerated or component depreciation is
used by the taxpayer as these methods permit a disproportionate share of depreciation
to be taken in the early years. As both the depreciation and interest expenses shrink,
cash flow from the project may become taxable as the smaller write-offs are not suffi-
cient to offset the cash flow. Obviously, income from other sources would also lose
shelter. When this occurs, usually somewhere between the fifth and the tenth years,
the investor will sell the project for capital gains and reinvest in a new shelter.
118. See I.R.C. § 1231. This section provides favorable capital gains treatment in
most circumstances. See generally Richardson, supra note 15, at 122-24; Bourdon,
Richard, Federal Tax Laws and Condominium Conversions: Possible Changes to Dis-
courage Conversions and Assist Rental Housing, Cong. Rec. H2981, H2983-84 (daily
ed. April 24, 1980).
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Thus, such favorable tax treatment provides strong incentives for the
landlord to convert to condominiums.
But how is it possible for the tenant, who formerly could barely
afford to pay the rent, to become a condominium owner when the
asking price seems to be beyond his or her means? The answer, of
course, is to be found in the tax code. As with the property seller, the
Internal Revenue Code provides strong tax advantages for the buyer,
favoring the "homeowner" and facilitating the tenant's conversion
from renter to condo owner.119
The following hypothetical will demonstrate a typical situation.
Mr. and Mrs. Burgher and their minor daughter, Gigi, live in a fifty-
unit luxury garden apartment building in Valhalia, State of Eupho-
ria. The gross income of the Burgher family is $35,000.00 a year.
They pay $600.00 per month rent, excluding utilities. Their landlord
has lost his tax shelter and has been approached by a developer to sell
the complex. 20 The developer would like to convert the complex
into condominiums because the housing market in Valhalla is tight.
The developer believes that she will make a handsome profit by con-
verting the Lorelei Apartments.
The developer has offered the Burgher's landlord $2,550,000 for
the apartments. 2 ' The developer hopes to sell the fifty units to peo-
ple like the Burghers for approximately $90,000.00 per unit, or
$4,500,000 for the entire fifty units."2 The developer is willing to
119. See notes 123-129 and accompanying text infra. The Internal Revenue Code
provides numerous incentives for homeownership by former renters. The principal
tax incentives are the availability of deductions for real property taxes, LR.C.
§ 164(a)(1), and mortgage interest, I.R.C. § 163(a). In addition, there are other incen-
tives such as favorable capital gains treatment; a one-time $10,000 exclusion of capital
ans from the sale of a principal residence of a taxpayer aged 55 or older, I.R.C.
121; a deferral of recognition of gain on the sale of a home if another home is
purchased within 18 months after the sale, I.R.C. § 1034; and other favorable treat-
ment if the taxpayer owns his home at the time of death, I.R.C. § 1014.
120. See notes 115-18 and accompanying text supra.
121. The developer has based his offering price on a capitalization rate of 14%, or
seven times the apartment complex annual gross revenue of $360,000. This rate re-
flects the riskiness of rental projects as investments. For instance other real estate
investments, such as regional shopping centers, are currently selling at approximately
twenty times the annual gross revenues. Speech of Hans Monter, President of CPI, a
New York real estate firm, at the Wharton School in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 25,
1980).
122. This increase of $2,000,000 demonstrates that in condominium conversions,
the sum of the parts is often greater than the whole. See Condominium Housing Issues:
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93rd
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provide purchase money mortgages for eighty percent of the
purchase price. A typical mortgage will be for $72,000, for thirty
years at thirteen percent interest. The Burghers will have to use most
of their certificates of deposit for the down payment of $18,000. They
will have to pay $796.46 a month in debt service.
A breakdown of the Burghers' projected housing costs looks like
this:
$ 9,557.56 debt service
1,000.00 local taxes
500.00 insurance
1,000.00 maintenance &
association fees"z
$12,057.56 total expense
Before conversion, the Burghers were paying $7,200.00 in rent and
struggling. The difference between the two costs is a staggering
$4,857.56. How can they afford to "go condo?" 12 4 The answer lies in
the Internal Revenue Code. By becoming homeowners, the Burghers
will be subsidized by various personal deductions that permit them to
spend more money on the condo than they thought they could.125
The year before conversion, the Burghers paid $6,617.00 in federal
income taxes. The computation was made as follows:
$35,000 gross income
- 1,000 business expenses
$34,000 adjusted gross income
Cong., 2nd Sess. 112-19 (1974) (Testimony of D. Clurman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of New York); Comment, Tenant Protection in Condominium Conversions: The
New York Experience, 48 ST. JOHN's L. RFv. 978, 982 (1974). There is a handsome
profit for a developer, even though some of the $2,000,000 mark-up goes to renova-
tion, marketing, and maintenance.
123. See note 21 supra. Payments to the management association for fees, assess-
ments, and other related expenses may be deductible, in part, for the taxpayer. I.R.C.
§ 528. See also Lippmann, Tax Aspects of Cooperative and Condominium Conversions,
Real Est. Rev. 39, 43-44 (1980).
124. See notes 125-30 and accompanying text infra. The Burghers may have little
choice in the matter because of the tightness of the real estate market in their city. In
most instances, although alternative rental housing may be available, the new rent
will generally be higher, and the tenant will have to endure the costs of searching for
and relocating to a new apartment. See generally 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at
IX-21 to 27.
125. The Burghers are permitted to take the following deductions for personal
expenses: mortgage interest, I.R.C. 163(a); property taxes, I.R.C. § 164; charitable
expenses, I.R.C. § 213. Before purchasing the condominium, the Burghers lacked suf-
ficient itemized expenses to reduce their taxes. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
After the purchase, their available deductions increased dramatically. Additionally,
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Their deductions were:
$2,000 state and local taxes
400 charity
500 medical
200 interest
$3,100 total deductions
They could not itemize and therefore took the zero bracket and used
the tax tables."2 6 Thus, their federal tax liability was $6,617.00.
After they become unit owners their deductions will increase dra-
matically:
$ 2,000 state and local taxes
400 charity
500 medical
9,347.80 interest 2 7
$13,247.80
-3,400 zero bracket
$ 9,847.80 excess deductions
$35,000 gross income
-1,000 business expenses
34,000
the taxable income and tax liability are diminished by these now itemizable personal
expenditures. See text accompanying notes 126-27 infra.
Below are the typical taxpayers' deductions.
Adjusted Medical, Casualty
Gross Income Dental Taxes Contributions Interest Theft
$ 8,000-$ 10,000 $1,100 $1,147 $ 524 $1,507 $ 658
$10,000-$ 12,000 $ 882 $1,179 $ 527 $1,589 $ 871
$12,000-$ 14,000 $ 806 $1,242 $ 475 $1,706 $ 652
$14,000-$ 16,000 $ 669 $1,421 $ 479 $1,868 $ 935
$16,000-$ 20,000 $ 632 $1,640 $ 545 $1,946 $ 598
$20,000-$ 25,000 $ 505 $1,954 $ 563 $2,085 $ 646
$25,000-$ 30,000 $ 520 $2,300 $ 676 $2,271 $ 502
$30,000-$ 50,000 $ 551 $3,124 $ 893 $2,637 $ 752
$50,000-$100,000 $ 748 $5,488 $1,965 $4,230 $1,402
Tax Deductions, U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 18, 1980, at 84.
126. The zero bracket amount is $3,400 for a joint return. I.R.C. § 63(d)(1); 1979
Tax Table B-Married Filing Joint Return, FEDERAL INCOME TAX FORMS 36 (Tax
Tables).
127. Interest is a permitted personal deduction. I.R.C. § 163. With all the interest
expenses from their condo, the Burghers may become more conscious of the expense
and remember to account for their credit card charges, auto loan interest, etc.
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-3,000 personal exemptions
31,000.00
-9,847.80 excess itemized deductions
$21,152.20 taxable income
The Burghers' federal tax liability is now $3,539.62.128 The home
ownership was worth $3,077.38. They can use their refund in federal
taxes to offset the increased housing cost. The Burghers are still short
$1,780.14. They will have a very tight budget. But the rental market
was very tight and had they been forced to move, moving costs and
increased rent would probably have caused their housing costs to in-
crease by approximately the same amount.129 Further, had they
moved, they would not have built up the equity 3 ' nor had the satis-
faction that comes from owning their own home.
This scenario demonstrates how the Internal Revenue Code not
only spurs the landlord to convert, but also assists the tenant with
enough of a subsidy to make purchase of a converted unit feasible,
and often even attractive. Nevertheless, not all tenants are as fortu-
nate as the Burghers. In fact, some estimate that over sixty percent of
all rental tenants earn less than $12,500 a year. 31 Recognizing that
these less fortunate persons do not have the Burghers' options, many
states and municipalities have enacted regulations to protect tenants
from the harmful effects of conversion.
128. Tax Tables, supra note 125, at 34.
129. Note that the landlord might have raised the rent by ten percent (10%) to
make up for inflation. Had he done so, they would have needed $720 more to meet
the rent. Thus, the Burghers need come up with an additional $1,028. As the housing
market is very tight, they probably lack alternatives.
130. As the condominium owner makes each mortgage payment, he acquires
greater equity in the property through his principal payments. Equity is defined as
"[t]he remaining interest belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged his prop-
erty, or the surplus of value which may remain after the property has been disposed of
for the satisfaction of loans." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). Later, if
the condominium owner sells his property, probably at an appreciated price, he re-
covers his equity investment plus the benefits of the appreciation. The renter, on the
other hand, obtains no equity in his apartment, receives no tax benefit from his rent
payments, and will not recapture any of the money expended to shelter himself.
131. See 1980 HUD STUDY, .upra note 1, at VI-14. The study indicates that 69%
of all renters nationally earn less than $12,500 per year. Further, only 12% of all
former renters actually purchase their converted units. Id
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
A. Introduction
This section provides an overview of the various legislative actions
and proposals designed to address the problem of condominium con-
version. The discussion begins with an examination of the general
governmental responses to protect tenants. Next, this section evalu-
ates certain specific, more innovative efforts developed by some legis-
latures. Discussion of municipal legislation predominates this section
because the problem, like that addressed by rent control, is peculiarly
local.
An examination of the legislative responses to the condominium
conversion problem requires an understanding of the constitutional
foundation for such regulation. The basis for this regulation is the
"police power," and its justification is to protect the "health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the community."' 32 The police power
is an inherent, residual power found at the lower levels of American
government. This power, which escapes simple definition, 33 is not
unlimited.134 A sovereign, whether it be a state or local government,
may exercise its police power only if its use is rationally related to the
promotion of a legitimate government objective.' 35
132. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER §§ 2-3 (1904); Stoebuck, Police Powers,
Takings, and.Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 1057, 1057-59 (1980). See gener-
ally 16A AM. JuR., Constitutional Law § 372 (1979).
133. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964):
No precise definition may be given for the term "police power:" It is used by the
courts to identify those state and local governmental restrictions and prohibitions
that are valid and that may be involved without payment of compensation. In its
best known and most traditional uses, the police power is employed to protect the
health, safety, and morals of the community.
I.d at 36 n.6.
134. The police power, existing at state and local government levels, has no ex-
press limitations. Rather, that power is subject to some implied constitutional re-
straints. First, a government exercise of police power must, to some extent, advance
the public interest. The regulation must comport with the requirements of substantive
due process; it can not be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. See Stoebuck, Mra
note 131, at 1057-58. Next, a valid exercise of police power can not contravene the
fifth and fourteenth amendments by taking property without just compensation. Chi-
cago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). See
also notes 291-316 and accompanying text infra.
For the purposes of this article, the examination of the police power and its limita-
tion will be limited to land use regulations and the related regulations affecting pri-
vate property rights.
135. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Goldblatt v. Town of
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Condominium conversion regulations derive from the police
power of the sovereign."3 6 Both state and local governments have
enacted these regulations to combat, as with rent controls, difficult
housing problems." 7 These ordinances and statutes have imposed
restrictions on both the building owner and the unit purchaser, some-
times even suspending certain property rights.'3 8 Further, although
the regulations promote the public welfare, some regulatory require-
ments so severely interfere with an owner's property that the exercise
may be improper. In some situations, a regulation's operation may
constitute a deprivation of property without due process. 3 9 An ex-
amination of the various conversion ordinances and statutes illus-
trates the range of interference presently tolerated under the auspices
of the police power.
B. Basic Tenant Protections
The Uniform Condominium Act"4 (UCA), which has served as a
model for many conversion ordinances, has established some of the
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1960); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The
Supreme Court in Nebbia stated the general tenets of the police power.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever.., policy may rea-
sonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legis-
lation adopted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or. . . override it. If the laws passed. . . have a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied .... [Tihe legislature is. . . the judge
of the necessity of such an enactment. . . [Elvery possible presumption is in
favor of its validity. . . . it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of
legislative power.
Id at 537-38.
136. For a discussion of the source of condominium conversion regulations and
analogous rent controls, see C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE, & P. ASCH, MUNICIPALITIES AND
MULTIPLE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING: CONDOMINIUMS AND RENT CONTROL (1976).
See also Snyderman & Morrison, upra note 11, at 981; Soloway, supra note 1, at 25.
137. See notes 39-45 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 208-330 and accompanying text infra.
139. See notes 274-316 and accompanying text infra.
140. The National Commission on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform
Condominium Act in 1977. Thus far, three states, West Virginia, Minnesota, and
Pennsylvania have adopted the Act with some minor variations. Several other states,
however, are considering adoption of the Act in some form. These states include:
Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Vermont and Wyoming. See generally J. SILVER
& C. SHREVE, CONDOMINUM CONVERSION CONTROLS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1979).
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basic tenant protection mechanisms found in jurisdictions regulating
conversions.14 The principal elements of protection are a notice re-
quirement 42 and an exclusive right to purchase.1 43 Some states have
also included some form of anti-harassment provision." The notice
requirement mandates that a converter notify tenants in writing at
least 120 days before requiring them to vacate of his intent to con-
vert.1 45 The purpose behind the notice requirement is to apprise ten-
ants of the need to locate new accommodations and to provide them
with sufficient time to do so. Both state and local governments have
141. See notes 142-43, 147-53 and accompanying text infra.
142. Uniform Condominium Act § 4-110(a) (requires 120 days' written notice).
143. Uniform Condominium Act § 4-110(b) (grants tenant a sixty day exclusive
right to purchase his or her unit, plus a 180-day restriction against the developer offer-
ing the unit on more favorable terms to another purchaser).
144. See notes 151-53 and accompanying text infra.
145. See note 142 supra. The following states have adopted a 120-day written
notice requirement: Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326(b)(2) (West Supp.
1980); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1268(b)(1) (Supp. V 1978) (the con-
verter must give this notice of conversion within ten days after his application for
registration of an offering statement concerning conversion before he can give his
tenants notice to vacate); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1623.1(a) (Supp. 1980) (re-
quires that notice set forth tenant rights); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 § 330(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (setting maximum notice requirement at one year); Michi-
gan, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 559.204 (Supp. 1980) (providing 120-day minimum
even if tenant had a month to month tenancy); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 515A.4-110 (West Supp. 1980) (requiring 120-day notice of either intent to convert
or conversion; and that notice contain a statement of tenants rights); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-79.94 (Mich. Supp. 1980); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 36B-4-
110(a) (Supp. 1980) (requiring 120-day notice which includes statement of tenant
rights); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1980) (requires 120-day writ-
ten notice of proposed conversion, although unclear whether declaration must be filed
before notice period begins). A number of cities have also imposed the 120-day no-
tice period: Los Angeles, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.5.2-E(2) (Nov. 10, 1979); San Fran-
cisco, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. XIII at § 1391(a) (July 2, 1979) (must be filed within five
days after filing of application to convert with Department of Public Works); Atlanta,
GA. CODE ch. 2 art. F, § 8-2183(a) (December 17, 1979); Minneapolis, MINN. CODE
§ 250.40 (October 26, 1979) (requiring extension of notice to vacate to 180 days if 1) a
tenant is 65 years of age or older, 2) any tenant is below 18 years of age; or 3) if any
tenant in the unit is handicapped). The following cities also have a 120-day notice
requirement: in California-Chula Vista, Concord, La Mesa, Long Beach, Oakland
(120 days from issuance of final report), and Walnut Creek; in Colorado-Boulder
(with special notice requirements to tenants 62 years of age or older); in Indiana-
Indianapolis; in Ohio-Lakewood and Lyndhurst; in Washington-Lynnwood (no-
tice required upon approval of conversion by City Council), Mercer Island (notice
required within 36 hours of filing condominium declaration), and Seattle (notice re-
quired before offering unit for sale, also must notify tenants within 5 days of filing).
See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at App. 2-X.
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adopted the notice requirement, many tapering it to meet the de-
mands of their particular rental housing markets."
Nearly every jurisdiction regulating conversions also follows the
UCA by providing tenants with either an exclusive right to purchase
or a right of first refusal. 47 In general, a right to purchase provision
grants a tenant an exclusive right to purchase his or her apartment for
146. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33-112(3) (Supp. 1980 (requiring only 90
days' notice); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427.1(c) (Deering Supp. 1981) (requiring 180
days' notice); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-883(4)(b) (1981) (requiring 180 days' notice);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.606(1)(b) (West Supp. 1980) (granting 180-day notice of in-
tended conversion to all tenants) and id § 718.606(1)(a) (270-day notice to tenants
residing in their apartments over 270 days); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-
102.1(a) (1979 Cum. Supp.) (requiring notice 180 days before the property is sub-
jected to the condominium regime); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:56 (Supp. 1979)
(requiring 90 days' notice); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.8) (West Supp. 1980) (requir-
ing 2 months' notice, subject to 3-year notice requirement before instituting eviction
proceedings); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3410(a), (f) (Purdon 1980) (must give one-
year notice to all tenants and subtenants, and two years' notice to persons 62 years of
age or older or disabled persons who have occupied their units for more than two
years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.200(2) (granting 90 days' notice) (West Supp.
1980). Thus, as a practical matter, Colorado and New Hampshire have the least re-
strictive state notice requirements, while New Jersey and Pennsylvania have the most
protective.
The variation in municipal and county notice requirements is just as great. Denver,
Colorado requires only 90 days' notice of intent to convert. DENVER, COLO. REV.
MUN. CODE § .2-1(8) (1979). The intermediate notice requirements are between 180
and 210 days. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE ch. I1A-SA (180 days unless a
tenant is 65 years of age or older or handicapped, these tenants receive 360 notice of
intent to convert); WEBSTER GROVES, MO., CODE § 30.315(3)(c) (1980) (requiring 180
days' notice); EVANSTON, ILL. ORDINANCE Art. IV, § 4-101 A. (210 days' notice). The
most restrictive local ordinances require a minimum of one year's notice. BOSTON,
MASS. ORDINANCE Ch. 4 § 204 (1979) (requiring 1 year notice on rent controlled or
vacancy decontrolled units; and two years' notice for the elderly and the handi-
capped); PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 9-1203 (1980) (requires 1 year's notice). See also
notes 173-178 and 189-191 and accompanying text infra (the ordinances discussed
therein usually have no notice requirement as conversions are regulated in a different
manner).
147. Eg., OK. REV. STAT. § 91.526(1)(a) (1979) (with the shortest right of refusal
of only 30 days after notice of intent to convert); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.612(l)(a)
(West Supp. 1980) (grants tenants residing in building at least 180 days before notice
of conversion 45 days to consider a developer offer, the time commencing when all
required purchase materials are delivered); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1980)
(60-day option to purchase which commences before delivery of notice to convert);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eee (McKinney Supp. 1980) (gives tenant 90 days of exclu-
sive right to purchase); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 330(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980)
(grants 120-day right of first refusal); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3410(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1980) (granting tenant 6-month right to purchase after receipt of notice of con-
version). The following other states have some form of right of first refusal: Arizona,
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a limited time, often sixty days. 4 ' In addition, even if the tenant
refuses the offer, the converter is commonly prohibited, for a pre-
scribed period of time, from extending a more favorable offer to a
third party.'4 9 The right to purchase provision has two primary pur-
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Virginia, and West Virginia. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, App. 2-X.
Numerous municipalities and counties have similar provisions: CONCORD, CAL.
ORDINANCE § 4479.B (1979) (90 days from date Final Public Report is filed); Los
ANGELES, CAL. MUN. CODE § 12.5.2.(c)(3) (1979) (60 days from issuance of subdivi-
sion report); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE Ch. XIII § 1387(b) (1979) (60 days
from date tenant is offered unit by developer in writing); ATLANTA, GA. CODE Ch. 2,
art. F. § 8-2184(a) (1979) (60 days after delivery of the offer to tenant); EVANSTON,
ILL. CODE art. IV, § 4-102A (1979) (providing 120 day right to purchase or 30 days
after condominium instruments are filed, whichever is longer); WEBSTER GROVES,
MO., CODE § 30.320(2) (February, 1980) (60 days after notice of intent to convert).
148. See, eg., Uniform Condominium Act § 4-110(b) (granting 60 exclusive right
of purchase to tenant); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1623e.l(b) (1980 Supp.) (60 days from
delivery of offer); VA. CODE § 55-79.54(4)(b) (Michie Supp. 1980) (60 days exclusive
right to contract); W. VA. CODE § 36B-4-110(b) (60 days exclusive right to purchase
by tenant). See also note 146 supra.
149. See, e.g, Uniform Condominium Act § 4-110, which states in relevant part:
"If a tenant fails to purchase the unit during that [60]-day period, the declarant may
not offer to dispose of an interest in that unit during the following [180] days at a price
or on terms more favorable to the offeree than the price or terms offered to the tenant
;" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.612 (West Supp. 1980) (only tenants residing for 6
months or more in their unit have a 45-day right of first refusal; thereafter if devel-
oper offers the unit at a price lower than to tenant, developer must notify tenant and
give him at least 10 days from notice to accept the offer); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-
1623e.l(b) (Supp. 1980) (after 60-day offer period, for 120 days, the developer may
not extend a better offer to a third party without giving the tenant at least 10 days to
consider the new offer); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.526(3) (1979) (prohibits declarant from
extending a more favorable offer to a third person for the 60 days following the termi-
nation of the exclusive right-to-purchase period); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3410(b)
(Purdon 1980) (preventing developer from making more favorable offer to third party
for six months after the exclusive right to purchase period has expired); a number of
cities also provide such protections; ATLANTA, GA. CODE Ch. 2, art. F, § 8-2184(a)
(1979) (preventing developer from making better offer to the public for 120 days after
the expiration of the right of first refusal period for tenants and subtenants); EVANS-
TON, ILL. CODE art. IV, § 4-102A (1979) (precluding developer from offering more
favorable terms to third parties for 180 days after expiration of right of first refusal);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. ORDINANCE § 250.50(a) (Oct. 26, 1979) (precluding more
favorable offer for 180 days after expiration of notice period).
Numerous states and cities with conversion statutes and ordinance have not pro-
vided such protections for the tenant; these states are: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Ohio;
among the cities are: Los Angeles, California, San Francisco, California: Denver,
Colorado, Boston, Massachusetts; and Webster Groves, Missouri.
Thus far, the right of first refusal has been referred to generally. Actually there are
two separate right to purchase provisions employed by states and some municipalities.
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poses. First, it gives the tenant an opportunity to insure him or her-
self of adequate housing when alternative housing is not readily
available. Second, the provision discourages developers from forcing
out tenants by making unreasonable offers. It also has the side effect
of encouraging developers to offer tenants discount prices in order to
have ready cash on hand to complete their conversions. Again, as
with the notice provisions, the states and cities that have adopted
right to purchase requirements have conformed them to the availabil-
ity of alternative housing in their jurisdictions.'50
Finally, many jurisdictions have enacted legislation regulating de-
veloper conduct during the period before and during the conversion
process."5 Generally, developers are prohibited from unreasonably
One type of right of first refusal is merely that, a right of first refusal. The developer
may make a public offer, and when he obtains a potential purchaser, the present ten-
ant must decide. The second right of first refusal is often referred to as the exclusive
right to contract. That provision provides the tenant with no competition in dealing
with the developer, it is more protective of the tenant's interest.
Along with these provisions, a number of jurisdictions have added provisions per-
mitting tenants to "cool off" after contracting to purchase their units. Such a provi-
sion insures against tenant coercion. For example, in Concord, California, a tenant
may rescind a contract to purchase his unit if the developer has not conveyed it within
six months of the contracting. See generally 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, App. 2-
X. This article, however, will not examine the purchaser protection available.
The right of first refusal, however, does not apply to tenants in all conversions.
Generally, such provisions are applicable only ifi 1) the unit was residential before
conversion; and 2) the unit was not substantially altered from its original form. Thus,
if a developer combined two units, neither tenant should be entitled to the first refusal
right. This limitation has been adopted by the Uniform Condominium Act § 4-110(b)
and followed in many states and cities: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.612(1) (West Supp.
1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1623e.l(d) (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 515A.4-1 10(b) (Supp. 1980); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3410(b) (West Supp. 1980)
(limited to rental units which before conversion were nonresidential); VA. CODE § 55-
79.94(4)(b) (Michie Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 368-4-1 10(b) (West Supp. 1980); AT-
LANTA, GA. CODE Ch. 2, art. F, § 2184(c) (1979); EVANSTON, ILL. CODE art. IV, § 4-
102B (1979). Additionally, this right is generally waivable by the tenant. Cf. Los
ANGELES, CAL. MUN. CODE § 12.5.2E (3) (1979) (providing in the event two units are
combined, all former tenants of the units combined shall receive notification of an
exclusive right to purchase; the tenant excluded from purchasing his unit is entitled to
an alternative unit to the extent possible).
150. See notes 14749 supra.
151. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1326D, 33-1327 (West Supp. 1980)
(requiring landlord to: 1) honor the terms of the present lease; 2) obtain tenant con-
sent before commencing conversion work on the premises; 3) maintain the premises
in a manner comparable to its condition before notice of conversion; and 4) protect
tenants' quiet enjoyment of the premises); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-88b-4(4)(b), (f)
(1981) (limiting increases in rent and preventing evictions for failure to purchase
connected units); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.612 (West Supp. 1980) (requiring that
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raising rents, withholding services, or otherwise harassing their ten-
ants.152 The underlying purpose of such provisions is to protect ten-
ants from developer coercion. A tenant is entitled to both quiet
enjoyment during tenancy and an opportunity to freely decide
whether to purchase his or her apartment. This provision attempts to
control developer abuses which have occasionally arisen during con-
version. 153
The UCA and its progeny furnish a minimum of tenant protection.
They simply mitigate the hardship of sudden surprise that often re-
sults when conversions go unregulated. The statutes provide little aid
in rectifying the tenant displacement problem and offer virtually no
assistance in preserving an adequate rental housing stock.
nonpurchasing tenants receive equal access to present services); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
30, § 330 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (developer limited to showing unit to prospective pur-
chasers on a reasonable number of times only during the last 90 days of an expiring
tenancy); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-1 10(a) (West Supp. 1980) (precludes altering
of lease terms and prohibiting remodeling of the premises during the statutory notice
period unless adequate safety precautions are taken); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3410(e)(3) (Purdon 1980 Supp.) (generally prohibiting developer coercion); OR.
REV. STAT. § 91.526(3) (1979) (prohibits showing of tenant's apartment before termi-
nation of tenancy unless tenant grants permission); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eee-3
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980) (requiring that nonpurchasing tenants receive all serv-
ices on a nondiscriminatory basis); VA. CODE § 55-79.94(4)(b) (Michie 1980) (prohib-
iting during notice period unless developer gives 45-day written notice); SAN
FRANcIsco, CAL. MUN. CODE Ch. XIII §§ 1389, 1390 (July 2, 1979) (requiring devel-
oper to relocate tenant, at developer's expense (over and above tenant's rent), during
renovation of the unit; and limiting rent increases for a maximum of two years, except
that after one year landlord may receive a rent increase proportionate to the cost of
living index). A number of other cities and counties have imposed similar tenant
protections: Oakland, California (no remodeling during tenancy; no rent increases);
Los Angeles County, California (no remodeling unless tenant vacates or purchases his
unit); Marin County, California (no repairs or remodeling until 30 days after final
report); Walnut Creek, California (no rent increase for two years after application of
conversion, unless unit is sold or application withdrawn); Arlington Heights, Illinois
(prohibiting landlord from showing unit without tenant consent for 75 days before
lease termination or during right to purchase period, whichever is longer); Evanston,
Illinois (no remodeling of an occupied unit); Beachwood, Ohio (no rent increase
greater than consumer price index for previous 12 months); Lakewood, Ohio (limiting
landlord access to display the unit to twice every 7 days); Lyndhurst, Ohio (limiting
landlord access to display the unit to twice every 7 days); Everett, Washington (limit-
ing rent increases); and King County, Washington (limiting rent increases before
filing declaration to 10% of based rent; and prohibiting rent increases during 120-day
notice period). See generally 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, App. 2-X.
152. See note 151 supra.
153. See Mursten, 5upra note 11, at 1110. See also SILVER & SHREVE, supra note
140, at 40-1.
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C. Increasing the Tenant's Rights
The second level of condominium conversion statutes and ordi-
nances incorporates the basic tenant protections, but extends them, in
part, by making the developer bear a greater cost. In some cases, the
added protections are merely extensions of the notice and exclusive
right to purchase periods.' 54 Such provisions are only negligibly
more burdensome on developers desiring quick conversions with
sizeable profits. Other provisions, however, clearly give tenants
greater rights against developers.
These more stringent tenant protections include such considera-
tions as lease-breaking provisions, 55 lease extensions, 156 and reloca-
tion assistance for displaced tenants. 57 Lease-breaking provisions,
for example, grant the tenant an affirmative right to terminate his or
her lease without penalty before it expires.' 8 Usually, these provi-
sions require a tenant to give written notice of an intent to terminate
thirty to sixty days in advance of relocating.1 59 Similarly, some stat-
utes cover tenants who enter leases after notice of conversion. 160
These tenants may also terminate their new leases within a shortened
154. See notes 142-43 and 145-50 supra.
155. See notes 158-60 and accompanying text infra.
156. See notes 161-64 and accompanying text infra.
157. See notes 165-69 and accompanying text infra.
158. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1328 (West Supp. 1980) (applicable to all
leases entered into after effective date of statute); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-88b-(4)(b)
(1981); MD. REAL PROPERTY CODE ANN. § 11.102.1(e) (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 515A.4-1 10(a) (West Supp. 1980); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3410(e)(2) (Pur-
don Supp. 1980); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § I A-7(B) (1980); WEBSTER
GROVES, Mo. CODE § 30.300(8)(e) (1980); PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 9-1204(4)
(1979) superseded by 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3410(e)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
Numerous other cities and counties provide similar lease-breaking provisions: in
California-Cupertino, Garden Grove, Oakland; In Illinois-Skoke; in Ohio-Lake-
wood, Lyndhurst; in Washington-Seattle. 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, App. 2-
X. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.606(3) (West Supp. 1980) (permitting only termination
of any statutory tenancy extension). Butsee N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:56 (Supp.
1979) (expressly precluding any alteration of existing landlord-tenant relationships).
159. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-88b(4)(b) (1981); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 11-102.1(e) (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 575 A.4-1 10 (Supp. 1980); MoNT-
GOMERY CoUNTY, MD. CODE § I IA-7(B) (1980); WEBSTER GROVES, Mo. CODE
§ 30.300(8)(3) (1980). Cf. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1328B (West Supp. 1980) (re-
quiring tenant to notify landlord of termination within 30 days of notice of conver-
sion); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33-112 (Supp. 1980) (permitting termination of lease
extension at any time if developer pays moving expenses); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3410(e) (Purdon Supp. 1980) (requiring 90 days' written notice).
160. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-110(a) (West Supp. 1980) (granting
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period. The lease-breaking provisions give tenants greater flexibility
in relocating. A tenant may search for and lease a new apartment
during his or her present lease.
Lease extension provisions, on the other hand, anticipate that some
tenants may have difficulty locating suitable replacement housing.
These provisions usually take one of two forms. One type of lease
extension provision relates to the notice requirement previously dis-
cussed. 16 1 A tenant who receives notice of an intent to convert may
continue to occupy his unit for the specified statutory notice period or
for the remainder of the existing lease, whichever is longer.162 The
second type of lease extension provision grants a tenant a fixed pe-
riod extension on his present tenancy, irrespective of the lease re-
quirement.1 63 Thus, even after the developer has notified a tenant of
conversion, and the notice period has lapsed, a tenant whose lease
has expired may continue to rent his apartment for the additional
statutory period. Cities with large elderly populations frequently em-
ploy these protections.'
The last of the common, but more stringent tenant protections is
relocation assistance. Although the general elements of relocation
assistance provisions are similar, their specific contents vary from ju-
subtenant, as well as tenant, the right to terminate tenancy with thirty days' written
notice).
161. See notes 155-160 supra.
162. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33-112.(3); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-88(b)(4)(b)
(1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 § 330(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); 68 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3410(e)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1980) (implicit in terms which precludes declarant
from terminating lease in violation of its terms); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE
Ch. XIII § 1391(a) (1979); BOSTON, MA. ORDINANCE § 204 (1979).
163. At the end of the fixed period, the tenant may be forced to vacate. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326B (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.606(1)(a), (b)
(West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1623e. l(a) (West Supp. 1980); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-102.1(d) (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-110(a)
(West Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2723(b) (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 55-
79.94(4)(b) (Michie 1980); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. ORDINANCE § 250.40 (1979); WEB-
STER GROVES, MO. CODE § 30-320(e) (1980). Cf. Los ANGELES, CAL. MUN. CODE
§ 12.5.2 G.6 (1979) (providing a flexible extension requirement not to exceed one year
in most circumstances, except for. 1) people over 62 years of age; 2) the handicapped;
3) families with minor dependent children; and 4) residents of a low- or moderate-cost
housing unit.
164. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at App. 2-X, noting the following cities
have provided special lease extensions for the elderly: in California-Duarte, Los
Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, and Walnut Creek; in Illinois-Chicago and Sko-
kie; in Indiana-Indianapolis; in Massachusetts-Boston, Brookline and Cambridge;
in New York-New York City; in Ohio-Lakewood and Lyndhurst.
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risdiction to jurisdiction."" Many municipalities require developers
to pay the relocation expenses of displaced tenants. 166 Most ordi-
nances either fix the maximum amount a developer must pay167 or
specify that assistance is limited to actual moving costs.1 68
Some ordinances limit relocation assistance to elderly or low- to
medium-income tenants. 69 Nevertheless, the relocation assistance
programs serve two important purposes. First, they compensate dis-
placed tenants for expenses incurred in relocating. Second, the pay-
ment requirement operates, to some extent, as a deterrent. In large
multi-unit buildings, the additional costs of relocation assistance may
prevent owners from opting to convert; they simply may not have
enough ready cash available to both renovate their property and relo-
cate their present tenants.
165. See notes 166-69 and accompanying text infra.
166. Only five states have expressly discussed relocation payments in their conver-
sion statutes. Colorado provides that the developer might pay moving costs to a ten-
ant if the tenant agrees to move during the statutory notice period. COLO. Rnv. STAT.
§ 38-33-112(4) (Supp. 1980). Connecticut contemplates relocation assistance up to
$500 for low-income tenants. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-88d (1981). New Jersey provides
for one month rent payment as moving expenses, except after a one year stay of evic-
tion, the owner can give 5 months' rent to prevent further stays of eviction. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.10.
Tennessee, the third state considering relocation assistance, requires the developer
to pay moving costs only if the tenant is unlawfully forced to move during the statu-
tory notice period. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2723(c) (Supp. 1980). Florida provides
for an optional payment of one month's rent if the tenant will agree to reduce his 270-
day period to 180 days. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.606(4) (West Supp. 1980).
According to the most recent HUD Study, the following cities have provided for
relocation assistance requirements for their displaced tenants: in California-Los
Angeles City, Los Angeles County, Mountain View, Oceanside, San Diego, San Fran-
cisco, Santa Ana, and Walnut Creek; the District of Columbia; in Illinois--Evanston
and Skokie; in Washington-Everett, King County and Seattle. 1980 HUD STUDY,
supra note 1, at App. 2-X.
According to a survey by the Office of Planning and Research/Housing & Commu-
nity Development in California, the following additional California cities require the
developer to assist or pay for tenant relocation: Alameda, Belmont, Fullerton, Menlo
Park, Fremont, San Mateo and Santa Clara. See Soloway, supra note 1, at 12-13.
167. See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL. MUN. CODE § 12.5.2 G. 7, 8 (1979) (providing
that converter should pay actual moving costs up to $500 plus provide an uncondi-
tional relocation fee up to $500); SEATTLE, WASH. ORDINANCE 107707 § 3.9 (1978)
(fixing maximum relocation assistance at $350).
168. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE Ch. XIII, § 1392(a) (1979) (pro-
viding for payment of actual moving costs up to $1,000).
169. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at App. 2-X (noting that Evanston and
Skokie, Minois will pay relocation assistance to persons receiving Section 8 housing
subsidies).
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All the mechanisms of tenant protection discussed thus far reflect
governmental concern with the tenant displacement problem. The
function of these provisions is to insure that tenants have an opportu-
nity to seek alternative housing with a minimum of inconvenience.
Ordinances containing these provisions neither prevent conversions
nor attempt to preserve sufficient rental housing. Though these pro-
tections mitigate the hardships caused by conversion, they do not
solve the problem of inadequate housing alternatives. Thus, even if a
tenant has all these protections available, he or she still has no assur-
ance that other comparable apartments will be available in his or her
present neighborhood, or elsewhere in the city.
D. Protecting Tenants by Preserving Rental Housing
Some municipalities have enacted ordinances that more directly
address the real conversion problem: inadequate rental housing. 170
These ordinances have the objective of insuring that rental housing is
available to all tenants who want it. This objective is achieved by
preventing developers from converting their buildings absent an ade-
quate supply of comparable rental units in the community. 171 Only
one municipality has expressly imposed an absolute and permanent
ban on conversion activity.172 Many other municipalities, however,
have enacted ordinances that have this defacto effect, although they
technically permit conversion.'73 These municipalities have deterred
conversions through a variety of methods.
1. Rent and Eviction Controls
Some state and local governments have preserved available rental
housing by regulating the eviction of tenants from rent-controlled
apartment buildings. 174 Rent controls, like condominium conversion
170. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 171-208 and accompanying text infra.
172. The City of San Carlos, California is the sole city to permanently ban con-
versions. See Myers, Litigating the Regulation of Condominium Conversions, in ALI-
ABI STUDY MATERIALS-LAND USE LITIGATION 528 (1979).
173. Such cities include: Santa Monica, California, and Brookline and Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. See also notes 300-15 and accompanying text infra.
174. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-61.1-.13 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. GEN. Bus. Law
§ 352eee (McKinney Supp. 1980) (regulating conversions through eviction in N.Y.
City through New York City Rent and Eviction Regs. § 55 (found following N.Y.
UnconsoL Law § 8700 (McKinney 1974)); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 451-
1.0-18.0 (1975 & Supp. 1979); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 4451-1.0 to -8.0
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legislation, are designed to contend with the problems caused by tight
housing markets. These regulations attempt to assure adequate hous-
ing at reasonable prices. Because of the similarities, a number of cit-
ies have used their rent control laws as a mechanism for regulating
condominium conversion.
Some jurisdictions have modified their rent control laws in con-
templation of the conversion problem.' 75 The modifications deny a
developer a certificate of eviction for "just cause" if he or she merely
wishes to convert his or her building.'7 6 The developer may evict
tenants only for failure to pay rent or commission of another bad act
otherwise proscribed by the rent control ordinance.' 77 Additionally,
(1975 & Supp. 1979); BOSTON, MASS ORDINANCE §§ 200 to 210 (1979); CAMBRIDGE,
MASS. Code No. 929 §§ 1 (1980); SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA Art. XVIII § 1800 to -
10 (1979). For an excellent discussion of the complex New York City eviction con-
trols, see Note, The Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 507, 543-54.
175. See note 174 and accompanying text supra.
176. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 K (West Supp. 1980). This statute was
upheld in Fishman v. Pollack, 165 N.J. Super. 235, 237, 397 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1979).
Before these recent eviction controls were implemented, landlords could remove
their rent-controlled buildings from the rental housing market for the purposes of
conversion. Consequently, they circumvented the rent control protections, and added
pressure to the local rental housing markets. See also Baker v. City of Santa Monica,
WEC 058763 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct., July 19, 1979) (memorandum opinion)
reprimedin ALI-ABA STUDY MATERIALS-LAND USE LITIGATION 577 (1979); Stein
v. City of Santa Monica, WEC 059251 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct., July 19, 1979)
(memorandum opinion) reprintedin ALI-ABA STUDY MATERIALS-LAND USE LITI-
GATION 579 (1979) (upholding the eviction control ordinance that precluded removal
of rent control units for conversion purposes); Zussman v. Rent Control Board of
Brookline, 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975); Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979).
177. E.g., SANTA MONICA RENT CONTROL CHARTER art. XVIII, § 1806 (1979),
which provides:
Section 1806. Eviction: No landlord shall bring any action to recover possession
or be granted recovery of possession of a controlled rental unit unless:
a) The tenant has failed to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled under
the rental housing agreement and this Article.
b) The tenant has violated an obligation or covenant of his or her tenancy other
than the obligation to surrender possession upon proper notice and has failed to
cure such violation after having received written notice thereof from the landlord
in the manner required by law.
c) The tenant is committing or expressly permitting a nuisance in, or is causing
substantial damage to, the controlled rental unit, or is creating a substantial in-
terference with the comfort, safety or enjoyment of the landlord or other occu-
pants or neighbors of the same.
d) The tenant is convicted of using or expressly permitting a controlled rental
unit to be used for any illegal purpose.
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a few rent control jurisdictions go further and regulate the removal of
any rent-controlled unit from the rental housing market.17 Such
provisions prohibit removal by conversion, demolition, or other
means unless approved by the local rent control board.1 79 While
these provisions impose great restrictions on a property owner, they
do not absolutely bar conversion. The rent control regulations
merely insure present tenants they will have rental housing.
2. The Tenant Approval Requirement
A small number of states and municipalities allow conversions,
e) The tenant, who had a rental housing agreement which has terminated, has
refused, after written request or demand by the landlord, to execute a written
extension or renewal thereof for a further term of like duration and in such terms
as are not inconsistent with or violative of any provisions of this Article and are
materially the same as in the previous agreemcnt.
f) The tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the controlled rental
unit for the purpose of making necessary repairs or improvements required by
the laws of the United States, the State of California or any subdivision thereof,
or for the purpose of showing the rental housing unit to any prospective pur-
chaser or mortgage.
g) The tenant holding at the end of the term of the rental housing agreement is
a subtenant not approved by the landlord.
h) The landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy
of herself or himself, or her or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law.
i) The landlord seeks to recover possession to demolish or otherwise remove the
controlled rental unit from rental residential housing use after having obtained
all proper permits from the City of Santa Monica.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, possession shall not be granted if it is
determined that the eviction is in retaliation for the tenant reporting violations of
this Article, for exercising rights granted under this Article, including the right to
withhold rent upon authorization of the Board under Section 1803(a) or Section
1809 or for organizing other tenants. In any action brought to recover possession
of a controlled rental unit, the landlord shall allege and prove compliance with
this Section.
178. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS. CODE No. 929 § l(b)(4) (1980) (removal regu-
lation covers occupancy of unit by landlord, demolition, and rehabilitation in prepa-
ration for conversion).
179. See CAMBRIDGE, MASS. CODE No. 929 § 1(c), (d) (1980); SANTA MONICA
RENT CONTROL CHARTER art. XVIII, § 1803(t) (1979). Both ordinances empower the
local rent control boards to issue permits for removing rental units from the housing
markets. Issuance of the permit is based on examination of the housing situation in
the locality, thus giving the board discretion to permit some conversions. The board
will consider such factors as the hardship on the present tenants, the condition of
rental housing supply in the present market, and whether persons protected under the
ordinance would benefit from retaining the owner's building in the rental market.
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even in tight housing markets, by developers who obtain tenant con-
sent for their projects. These jurisdictions require approval by a fixed
percentage, usually thirty-five percent, of tenants residing in a build-
ing.180 Tenant approval provisions come in two forms: one requires
that a fixed percentage of tenants agree to purchase their units;' 8' the
other requires only consent by the tenants for conversion.' 82
Approval provisions, which sometimes are attached to rent control
or other types of conversion regulations, operate both as a sword and
a shield for tenants. On the one hand, they guarantee present tenants
available rental housing so long as the requisite percentage of them
find conversion undesirable. On the other hand, approval require-
ments give tenants a fairly powerful bargaining tool against their
building's owner. If an owner is anxious to convert, a tenant ap-
proval requirement is strong inducement for him or her to sweeten
the pot for the tenants. Frequently, the owner will give tenants sub-
180. See notes 181-92 and accompanying text infra.
181. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352eeel(b), (c) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (ap-
plicable to New York State generally) (requiring 15% of present tenants' consent to
purchase on a non-eviction plan before a conversion application will be declared ef-
fective; and requiring 35% of present tenants' consent to purchase on an eviction
plan); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352eeee 1(b), (c) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (applying
same percentage requirements); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE Ch. XIII § 1388
(requiring 40% of tenants to submit written intent to purchase forms before City Ap-
proval of the conversion or indicate they are eligible for lifetime leases).
Without digressing too deeply into the malaise of the New York conversion regula-
tions, the distinction between the eviction and non-eviction plans is in order. An
eviction plan, requiring the 35% tenant agreement to purchase, permits the developer
to commence eviction proceedings against the present, nonpurchasing tenants two
years after the plan becomes effective. N.Y. GEN Bus. LAw"352eee2(d) (McKinney,
Supp. 1980). Under this plan, the developer may then convey the remaining 65% of
the units fairly rapidly. A non-eviction plan, however, requires the lesser percentage
because the developer agrees not to commence eviction proceedings against the re-
maining, non-purchasing tenants unless the tenants breach their obligations to their
landlords. Id at 352eee2(c). Under this plan, absent voluntary terminations or ten-
ant misconduct, the developer will probably be a landlord for a considerably longer
period.
182. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 5-1281(b)(2) (Supp. V 1978) (permitting
conversion of low- or moderate-rent housing accommodations if a majority of the
tenants approve, even if the vacancy rate is below the statutory minimum for conver-
sion); PALO ALTO, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 2133, § 21.33.050(c) (1974) (requiring con-
sent of two-thirds of tenants for conversion). See Note, Municipal Regulation of
Condominium Conversion, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 235, 235 n.68 (1979). See also 1980
HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at App. 2-X (noting that in California, Newport Beach
(67%), and San Bernadino (67% if below 6% vacancy rate) also require tenant ap-
proval).
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stantial discounts on their units or offer them a premium for vacat-
ing.18 3 Either way, most tenants will be in a better position to obtain
housing. Additionally, if the owner refuses to make major com-
promises, he or she will be unable to convert, thus preserving avail-
able housing."8
3. The Moratorium as a Means of Preserving Rental Housing
Many jurisdictions, at one time or another, have imposed morato-
ria prohibiting all condominium conversions. Moratoria preserve the
status quo and thus protect tenants from the adverse impacts of sud-
den displacement.185 Moratorium ordinances vary in both type and
duration.
a. Temporary Convermion Moratoria
Cities facing rapidly increasing conversion activities often enact
temporary moratoria to halt that activity.186 The purposes of such
183. See Comment, Conversion f,4partments to Condominiums and Cooperatives:
Protecting Tenants in New York, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REv. 705, 709-12 (1975).
184. Under the New York conversion regulations, for example, the developer is
subject to rather dramatic time limits. To convert his or her apartment, the developer
must submit a conversion plan to the New York Attorney General's office. Once
submitted, the plan will be declared effective only if the fixed percentage, be it thirty-
five or fifteen percent of the tenants, agree to purchase their apartments within six
months of the offering. If the developer fails to reach that percentage within the allot-
ted time, the plan must be abandoned. Thereafter, the developer must wait eighteen
months before he may submit a new plan. See Note, The Regulation of Rental 4part-
ment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 546-47 (1980). See also Note, Govern-
ment Regulation of Condominium Conversion, 8 B.C. ENv. AFF. L. REv. 919, 943-46
(1980); Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem-Causes and Solutions,
1980 DuKE LJ. 306, 324-25.
185. See Soloway, supra note 1, at 11-14; Silver & Shreve, supra note 140, at 42;
Snyderman & Morrison, supra note 11, at 978-80. For an example of such a morato-
rium, based in part in displacement problems, see PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 9-1206
(September 27, 1979) (imposing 18-month moratorium on filing of Declarations of
Condominium with and notifying tenants of intent to convert). This ordinance was
subsequently preempted by 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101 to 3414 (Purdon Supp.
1980).
186. Over thirty-one cities have imposed temporary moratoria to halt conversion
activities. The major cities employing such moratoria include Chicago, Illinois (40
days); Miami Beach, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (18 months); San Francisco,
California (imposing two separate moratoria, the first in 1974 for 13 months, the sec-
ond in 1979 for 3 months); San Jose, California; Seattle, Washington; and Washing-
ton, D.C. (imposing three separate emergency moratoria). See 1980 HUD STUDY,
supra note 1, at XII-4. One state has imposed a de facto 8-month moratorium. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-88(c) (1981).
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moratoria are two-fold. First, cities attempt to ameliorate potential
housing shortages by preventing displacement for the duration of a
moratorium."8 7 Second, cities employ moratoria to give them time to
investigate their conversion problem and its ramifications.ss During
temporary moratoria, which usually last from thirty days to a year,18 9
localities develop permanent legislation to regulate conversions.
Temporary moratoria thus have a limited duration and merely serve
as stop-gap provisions.
b. Moratoria Related to Vacancy Rate
In an effort to preserve existing rental housing and insure an ade-
quate housing supply, some cities have promulgated moratoria of a
more permanent nature. These ordinances prohibit all conversion
activity unless the vacancy rate of rental housing in the city or county
exceeds a certain percentage of the total housing stock of that area,
commonly three to five percent. 1" They do not completely ban con-
versions; rather they attempt to preserve an adequate and available
187. See 1980 HUD STUDY, supra note 1, at XII-6. See also note 185 supra.
188. Id See also 126 CONG. REC. S2003 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1980) (remarks of
Sen. Williams).
189. The shortest moratoria have had thirty-day durations. They were imposed
in Miami Beach, Florida in February, 1980 and in Glastonbury, Connecticut in De-
cember, 1979. The longest moratoria were imposed by Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
and Mountain View, California, each prohibiting conversion for eighteen months.
Most moratoria last no longer than one year. See 1980 HUD STUDY, Jupra note 1, at
XII-4.
190. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS. CODE No. 929 § l(e)(1) (Feb. 14, 1980) (4%
vacancy rate requirement applies only to rent-controlled apartments); D.C. CODE EN-
CYCL.§ 5-1281(b)(1)(B) (Supp. VII 1980) (setting a vacancy rate of 3% for all apart-
ments not considered "high rent" under § 1281(b)(1)(B)(c)); Los ANGELES, CAL.
MuN. CODE § 12.5.2F(b) (1979) (5% vacancy rate); MARIN COUNTY, CAL. CODE tit.
20, ch. 2072 § 20.72.053 (1979) (5% vacancy rate); PALO ALTO, CAL. MUN. CODE
§§ 21.33.020-.050 (1974) (3% vacancy rate).
In Washington, D.C., the term "high rent housing accommodation" has been de-
fined as:
... any housing accommodation in the District of Columbia for which the total
monthly rent exceeds an amount computed for such housing accommodation as
follows:
i) multiply the number of rental units in the following categories by the cor-
responding rents established by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development for the District of Columbia as the current fair market rents
for existing housing under Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program for
Elevator or Non-Elevator (as appropriate) Buildings: I) efficiency rental units;
II) one bedroom rental units; III) two bedroom rental units; IV) three bed-
room rental units; V) four or more bedroom rental units; so that the rates are
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housing supply. Once the housing stock surpasses the minimum per-
centage, conversions may occur until available rental housing again
drops below the fixed percentage.' 9' While this regulation appears to
balance the needs of the community and the individual owner, in
actuality, it frequently operates as a total ban on conversions: the
higher the fixed percentage, the more difficult it is for the developer
to convert. 192
E. Other Regulations to Insure Adequate Low- and
Middle-Income Housing
Recently, a number of jurisdictions joined the State of New
York' 93 and a small number of cities in California' 94 in designing
special conversion legislation to deal with some of the problems of
not lower than $267 for one bedroom, $314 for two bedroom, $408 for three or
more bedroom and $221 for efficiency rental units; and
ii) total the results obtained in clause i) above; and
iii) increase the result obtained in clause ii) by the maximum percentage of
any upward rent adjustments found to be warranted by the District of Columbia
Rental Accommodations Commission pursuant to section 45-1687(b), beginning
with the 1978 Annual Report.
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 5-1281(B)(i)-(iii) (Supp. VII 1980). Washington D.C. and
Michigan are the only jurisdictions with a provision that restricts conversions on the
basis of rental cost. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50(c)(i)(2046) (1981). These provi-
sions more accurately balance the rights of property owners and tenants as they more
narrowly define the protected class under the ordinance. See also note 195 infra.
191. One of the difficulties with vacancy rate regulation is determining whether
the rate exceeds the fixed percentage. As studies are compiled, there usually is great
fluctuation in vacancy levels. Another problem with these regulations is defining "va-
cancy rate." Los Angeles, California establishes vacancy rates by relying upon its
Department of City Planning's Biannual Housing Inventory and Vacancy Estimate
and other surveys found satisfactory by an Advisory Agency. Los ANGELES, CAL.
MUN. CODE § 12.5.2 F.6 (1979). Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the other hand, sets
an alternative standard to the vacancy rate requirement, permitting conversion if the
total number of private rental units in the city exceeds the January 1, 1970 figure.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. CODE No. 929 § l(e)(2) (1980).
192. See Silver & Shreve, supra note 140, at 42. See generally GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL PROBLEM THAT NEEDS IMME-
DIATE ATTENTION i, 19 (Nov. 1979) (noting national vacancy rate of 4.8%). With a
national vacancy rate below 5%, and with the rate probably even lower in major ur-
ban areas with conversion activity, it is obvious that a 5% vacancy rate requirement
would generate as a de facto moratorium.
193. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352eeee 2(a)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980). See note
196 infra.
194. See Soloway, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that Santa Barbara, San Fran-
cisco, Walnut Creek, Los Angeles and Oakland provide special relief to the elderly
and low- to moderate-income tenants). See also SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note, at 63
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the elderly, the handicapped and low- and middle-income tenants.
Concern for these groups has grown because they are affected most
adversely by condominium conversions. 95 Generally, these groups
have less flexibility in locating alternative housing. They also may
encounter considerable difficulty in locating suitable housing, requir-
ing assistance in making their search. Consequently, the special reg-
ulations address such problems by requiring developers to either set
aside a specified number of units for these special classes of ten-
ants196 or in some way replacing the converted building with other
(noting that Del Mar, Escondido, La Mesa, San Diego, and Vista have special provi-
sions related to socio-economic standards).
195. See note 8 supra.
196. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.50(204a)-(204c) (1980) compiled in MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 559.204(a)-206(c) (1980 Supp.) (providing special protections for per-
sons over 65 years of age or any handicapped person residing in non-high rent build-
ings; limiting rent increases, providing lease renewals (65 years-69 years: 4 years; 70-
74 years: 6 years; 75 years-79 years: 7 years; 80 years old and above: 10 years), and
compensating the developer for such restricted tenancies); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§§ 352eeee 2(a)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (granting lifetime tenancies to persons
over 62 years of age, who earn less than $50,000 per year and have resided in the
building longer than two years (applies to permanently handicapped who have re-
sided in the building for two or more years regardless of income)); 68 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3410(f) (Purdon Supp. 1980) (granting tenants over 62 years of age 2-
year lease extensions if they have occupied the unit for at least two years); Los ANGE-
LES, CAL. MUN. CODE §§ 12.5.2 G(3), (4), (6) (1979) (protecting persons over the age
of 62, the handicapped, families with minors, and residents of low- to moderate-cost
rental units by requiring relocation assistance (locating new housing); and long-lease
extensions; SAN FRANcisco, CAL. MUN. CODE ch. XIII §§ 1341.(b), (c), (d), (e), (f),
1385, 1391(c) (1979) (requiring preservation of a portion of converted units for low-
and moderate-income tenants and guaranteeing permanent lease extensions for per-
sons sixty years of age or older).
The scope of these provisions can best be demonstrated by including a sample pro-
vision from SAN FRANcIsco, CAL. MuN. CODE, art. XII § 1385 (1979) providing:
Sec. 1385. Preservation of Low and Moderate Income Housing. The City Plan-
ning Commission shall determine whether any units to be converted are part of
the City's low or moderate income housing stocks. If the Commission deter-
mines that any unit to be converted is part of the City's low or moderate income
housing stocks, then the price of the unit upon conversion shall not be such as to
remove it effectively from said low or moderate income housing stocks and shall
be no greater than two and one half (2.5) times the highest income level for low
and moderate income households as defined in Section 1309(1) and (m). The
resulting sales prices established pursuant to this formula may be increased con-
sistent with any increases in the housing component of the "Bay Area Cost of
Living Index, U.S. Dept. of Labor," during the period between the most recent
establishment of the above highest income levels and the date of commencement
of sales. If the tenant does not exercise the contract right to purchase the unit
which has been determined to be part of the low or moderate income housing
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comparable alternative housing.' 97 Such provisions are usually in
addition to the increased protections these groups already receive
under the more basic tenant protection measures.
Regulations that require developers to set aside converted units in
their buildings usually take two forms. One type of regulation per-
mits developers to convert their entire buildings if they provide a des-
ignated percentage of the converted units at a low price to these
classes of tenants.' 98 The other form of regulation grants particular
tenants, usually only the elderly and the handicapped, lifetime leases
in their apartments in the converted buildings.'9 9 In either case, a
developer can convert his or her building, although not at a maxi-
mum profit, while maintaining the interests of the tenant and the
public.
The second method of insuring an adequate housing supply for
"disadvantaged" tenants requires developers to replace each unit
stock, then the unit shall be made available exclusivelyfor purchase by qualfed
households oflow or moderate income on afirst-comefirst-served basisfor aperiod
ofnot less than twelve (12) monthsfrom the date of recordation of the Parcel Map
or Final Map at a price no greater than that allowed under the low and moderate
income price guidelines set forth above. Priority, however, shall be given to low or
moderate income households who can demonstrate that they had previously relo-
caedfrom a dwelling in a building which had been approvedfor condominium con-
version. The reconveyance of any unit purchased pursuant to the price
restrictions as set forth in Section 1341(b). In cases where no low or moderate
income household has purchased or contracted to purchase such unit within this
twelve (12) month period, after good faith efforts by the subdivider, the subdi-
vider may offer the unit to the general public with no price limitation.
This regulation is a strong attempt to both protect low-income housing and to carry
out the city's comprehensive plan. This plan is provided with more leverage by
§ 1388 which requires 40% approval. The result of successful conversion is to give the
developer some profit, to provide an adequate supply of low- and moderate-income
housing, and to have a balanced diverse community in a rehabilitated setting.
197. See, eg., Los AN GELES, CAL. MUN. CODE § 12.5.2K (1979) (requiring the
applicant for conversion pay the city a $500 fee, before Final Map Approval, to be
applied to new rental housing production); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE art.
XIII §§ 1341(g), (h), 13431-5 (providing a developer, as an alternative to providing
available units for low-income tenants, can pay the City 10% of the difference be-
tween the aggregate total of proposed market sales and the aggregated total of sales
prices if sold at § 1385 formula rate). See also Note, Munic#7alRegulation of Condo-
minium Conversions, 53 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 225 (1979); Comment, Conversion ofpart-
ments to Condominiums Social and Economic Regulations Under the California
Subdivison Map Act, 16 CAL. W. L. REv. 466 (1980).
198. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE art. XIII § 1385 (1979).
199. Se N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352eeee 2 (McKinney Supp. 1980); SAN FRAN-
CISCO, CAL. MUN. CODE art. XII § 1391(c) (1979).
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they convert with another rental unit. Some ordinances state that a
developer may construct or otherwise provide the same number of
alternative rental units as he or she wishes to convert.2°" Usually, the
developer must deliver these units near the time the conversion pro-
cess begins.201
Other ordinances provide a variation on the replacement require-
ment. Some jurisdictions permit conversions by developers who pay
the governing unit either a fixed fee or a percentage of the sale price
for each converted unit.2' Funds collected under these ordinances
are applied to new housing construction for displaced low- or moder-
ate-income tenants.20 3
The above-described set aside and replacement provisions come
closest to realistically addressing the entire conversion problem.
These provisions neither merely protect tenants nor ban conversions.
Cities employing them have attempted to balance the interests of the
tenant, the owner, and the potential condominium unit purchaser.
Conversion is possible when the owner makes some concessions. If
developers comply with the ordinances, they will receive their profits
and their city will have an adequate supply of comparable alternative
rental housing for the tenants who need it most.
F. Miscellaneous Regulations
Jurisdictions that regulate condominium conversions often com-
bine various protections, incorporating them into ordinances or other
forms of legislation. In enacting these measures, many jurisdictions
add their own gloss, certain nuances that more accurately reflect local
problems.
While most of the nuances are interesting, two variations are par-
ticularly noteworthy. A few jurisdictions have included provisions
that permit tenants to form an association to purchase their build-
200. See Comment, Convermion of Apartment to Condominiums: Social and Eco-
nomic Regulations Under the Calpornia Subdivision Map Act, 16 CAL. W. L. REv. 466,
488-89 (1979) (discussing the enactment of such an ordinance in La Mesa, California).
201. See SAN FRANCisco, CAL. MUN. CODE art. XIII § 1341(f) (1979) (permitting
developer to construct housing especially for low-income tenants within 18 months of
filing for conversion, in lieu of providing tenants 10% of the converted units).
202. See note 197 spra.
203. See note 197 supra.
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ing.2° Frequently, a tenant association provision is linked with the
previously discussed right of first refusal provision. The tenant asso-
ciation may have an exclusive right, for example for ninety days, to
purchase the building from their landlord.2" This provision may
make it easier for the individual tenant to purchase his unit. It would
be the organization, not the individual, that obtains financing for the
purchase. Additionally, this regulation serves to prevent displace-
ment.
The second interesting nuance involves a method of approving
conversions, even in tight housing markets. Some municipalities, no-
tably in California, have granted local agencies the power to permit
conversions.' 6 Unlike the more arbitrary rental vacancy rate provi-
sions, agency discretion provisions permit accurate reflection on the
actual housing climate in the area. Thus, an agency can allow con-
versions where the other more mechanical ordinances would not.
The agency may consider, among other things, whether the present
tenants have the wherewithal and desire to purchase their units, what
type of relocation assistance is offered by the developer, and whether
the apartments are high-income units."07 If the local agency deter-
mines that the community would not be injured by the conversion,
permission would be granted.20 Such provisions are beneficial be-
cause they permit desirable conversion activity. They neither affect
developers arbitrarily nor deny those tenants who need protection the
assurance of an adequate housing supply.
Obviously, the mechanisms discussed in the section affect the rights
of developers, tenants, and potential purchasers. Interference with
these rights is sometimes quite severe. As a result, many people have
challenged municipal conversion regulations as being unjust or insuf-
ficient. To more fully appreciate the conversion problem, an exami-
nation of the litigation is necessary.
204. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1695.9(a) (Supp. VI 1979); MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, MD. CODE § I 1A-8 (1980).
205. E.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1699.9(b) (Supp. VII 1980) (90 days to close the
deal); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § IlA-9(a), (b) (1980) (120 days to close
the purchase).
206. See Los ANGELES, CAL. MUN. CODE § 12.5.2 F(1)-(6) (1979); SANTA
MoNicA, CAL. RENT CONTROL CHRTER art. XVIII § 1803t (1979).
207. See Comment, supra note 200, at 491-92, discussing Vallejo City, California
ordinance which provides such consideration.
208. See note 178 suspra..
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V. LITIGATION-TESTING THE VALIDITY OF
CONVERSION REGULATION
This section will discuss and analyze the litigation that has arisen
from the increasingly rigorous regulation of condominium conver-
sions by many municipalities. Challenges to conversion control
ordinanaces have focused on two major areas: first, the power of a
municipality under state law to regulate a form of ownership; and
second, the constitutionality of these regulations. Some litigants have
successfully attacked municipal conversion regulations as being ei-
ther preempted by state law or beyond the scope of municipal "home
rule" powers. Other challengers, raising due process and equal pro-
tection issues, have persuaded courts to invalidate ordinances on con-
stitutional grounds. Generally, however, condominium conversion
laws have withstood both state and constitutional challenges.
A. The Municipality's Authority to Regulate Under State Law
1. State Preemption
A number of states have recently enacted "second generation" con-
dominium statutes.' These statutes reflect the general acceptance of
the condominium form of ownership and often include buyer and
tenant protections previously omitted from the original enabling
acts.210 The statutory tenant protections provided are seldom as se-
vere as their municipal counterparts.21 Consequently, when devel-
209. See CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 38-33-102 to -112 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 47-68(a) to -90(c) (1981); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 5-1201 to -1297 (West Supp.
1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.101-.622 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 85-1601(e) to -1645(e) (1975 & Supp. 1980); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 514A-1 to -108
(1977 & Supp. 1980); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 30 §§ 301-331 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp.
1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-6-1 to -31 (Bums 1977 & Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:1121.102 to .115 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
11.102 (1974 & Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.50(101) to (272) (1978 & Supp.
1981); MNN. STAT. ANN. 515A 1-101 to 4-414 (West Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:8A-1 to -28 (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-7-1 to -28 (1978); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 5311.01 to .27 (Anderson 1981); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 91.500 to .671 (1979); 68
PA. Co Ns. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3414 (Purdon Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-
2701 to -2723 (1976 & Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 55-79.39-.103 (1974 & Michie 1980);
W. VA. CODE §§ 363-1-101 t -4-115 (1980 Cum. Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 703.01 to
.38 (1977 & 1980 Special Pamph.).
210. See generaly 1980 HUD STUDY, Supra note 1, at XI-I to -30 for a thorough
discussion of buyer and tenant protections.
211. Cot"are Mursten, supra note 11, (noting the extensive tenant protection of
the "third generation" Florida Condominium Statute) with Ritter, supra note 13,
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opers and unit purchasers have encountered restrictive municipal
conversion regulations, they have often argued that state condomin-
ium legislation has preempted the field, precluding any conflicting
municipal action.212
In New Jersey, for example, a number of courts have accepted the
preemption argument as a basis for striking down moratoria and
other condominium conversion regulations.213 In Hampshire House
Sponsor Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee,2 14 a lower state court noted the
state had so comprehensively regulated conversions through eviction
controls2" 5 that there was "no room for individual municipalities to
helter-skelter adopt regulations. ... 6
Since Hampshire House, two other courts interpreting New Jersey
law have adopted the preemption doctrine. In Claridge House One v.
Borough of Verona,217 a federal district court struck down a munici-
pal moratorium similar to the one at issue in Hampshire House. The
court found not only preemption, but also direct conflict between the
state eviction provisions and the municipal ordinance.218 Similarly,
in Plaza Joint Venture v. City of Atlantic City,2 19 a state appellate
court declared a municipal conversion regulation void.2" The court
(pointing out the inadequacies of the Florida Statute, and the need for municipal
regulation to deal with local housing problems.
212. See notes 213-28 and accompanying text infra.
213. See notes 214-21 and accompanying text infra.
214. 172 NJ. Super. 426, 412 A.2d 816 (Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1979).
215. Id at 434, 412 A.2d at 821. The State of New Jersey has regulated condo-
minium conversions through eviction controls under its Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 to .12 (West Supp. 1981), rather than under its condominium
enabling legislation. The eviction controls have provided substantial and comprehen-
sive protection of tenants throughout the state. See also notes 173-78 and accompa-
nying text supra.
216. 172 NJ. Super. at 430, 412 A.2d at 818. The Fort Lee ordinance, BOROUGH
OF FORT LEE ORDINANCE No. 79-30 (Nov. 1, 1979), was a vacancy rate moratorium
which permitted conversions when the borough apartment vacancy rate exceeded five
percent. 172 NJ. Super. at 430, 412 A.2d at 818.
217. 490 F. Supp. 706 (D. NJ. 1980).
218. Id at 710. The Verona ordinance, BOROUGH OF VERONA ORDINANCE No.
15-79 (August 13, 1979), prohibited any conversion activity for one year. This prohi-
bition denied landlords the opportunity to evict tenants for conversion purposes. Id
at 708. This ordinance directly conflicted with a New Jersey statute that permitted
removal of tenants for the purpose of converting rental units into condominiums. See
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.lk (West Supp. 1980).
219. 174 NJ. Super. 231, 416 A.2d 71 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
220. Id at 242, 416 A.2d at 77.
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noted that even when a municipality properly enacts an ordinance
under its police power, the ordinance will be held invalid if it intrudes
on an area exclusively regulated by the state.22" ' This is the general
rule of preemption.
No state supreme court has considered the preemption issue as it
applies to condominium conversions. In Rockville Grosvenor, Inc. v.
Montgomery County,222 the Maryland Court of Appeals did consider
an analogous issue: whether local ordinances are invalid because
they conflict with state law. In Rockville Grosvenor, the court invali-
dated portions of the Montgomery County conversion ordinance
22 3
that provided tenants with relocation assistance and the right of first
refusal.224 The court found the provisions conflicted with certain
zoning and building regulations in the Maryland Horizontal Property
Act 225 which prohibited discrimination against the condominium
form of ownership.226 The court found two tenant provisions im-
221. Id at 238, 416 A.2d at 75.
222. 422 A.2d 353 (Md. 1980).
223. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE ch. 1 A (May 26, 1980). When plain-
tiffs commenced this lawsuit, a predecessor ordinance was in effect. 422 A.2d at 357-
59. Consequently, before the Maryland Court of Appeals heard the Rockville Grosve-
nor case, two issues, the validity of a 120-day moratorium on conversions and a mor-
atorium on the sale of rental units, became moot. Id
The court invalidated MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE ch. 11A-5(c), which re-
quired developers to reimburse displaced tenants for up to $750 of their relocation
costs. 422 A.2d at 364. It also struck down ch. 1 A-9, which provided certain tenant
organizations the first right to buy their apartment building if the owner contracted to
sell it to a converter. Id at 365-67. The court found these provisions treated condo-
miniums differently than apartment buildings, thus directly conflicting with the stat-
ute. Id See note 223 infra.
224. In the Rockville Grosvenor appeal, three provisions of the Montgomery
County Code were at issue. Aside from the relocation assistance and right to
purchase provisions, plaintiffs challenged a provision that prohibits developers from
selling units unless a property report is filed sixty days before first offering such units
for sale. Id at 367-69. The court upheld this section, MONTGOMERY CoUNTY CODE,
MD. ch. I A-4(a), finding it supplemental to, not in conflict with, the state condomin-
ium regulation. Id at 367.
225. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§11-101 to 128 (1974 & Supp. 1980). This
statute is a second generation statute, enacted in 1974 to supersede the original condo-
minium statute enacted in 1963.
226. The court focused on MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-120 of the Horizon-
tal Property Act. § 11-120 provides in part:
(b) No county, city or other jurisdiction may enact any law, ordinance, or regu-
lation which would impose a burden or restriction on a condominium that is not
imposed on all other property of similar character not subjected to a condomin-
ium regime. Any such law, ordinance, or regulation is void.
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posed burdens on condominiums not imposed on other buildings of
similar character.227 In invalidating portions of the local regulation,
the Rockville Grosvenor court, unlike the courts in the New Jersey
cases, did not rely upon the preemption doctrine. 28 The Maryland
court did not find comprehensive state regulation of condominium
conversions.
Although these cases suggest that the preemption doctrine can pro-
vide an effective means of challenging conversion ordinances, in real-
ity the doctrine has limited application. Generally, a preemption
attack will succeed only where a state has enacted comprehensive
conversion regulations.22 9 Many states, however, still retain their
Id at 360-61. The court, distinguishing § 11-120(b) from § 11-120(a) which prohib-
ited discriminatory land use treatment of condominiums, construed § 11-120(b) as
precluding all conflicting local regulation of condominiums. Id See also notes 228-
237 infra and accompanying text for consideration of the land use issue. The court,
however, negated any argument that the Horizontal Property Act had preempted the
field, expressly rejecting that contention. Id at 363. Instead, Judge Rudowsky ex-
amined each challenged provision to see whether it was in conflict with § 11-120(b).
Absent such a conflict, he upheld the statute.
227. 422 A.2d at 364.
228. See note 226 supra. Under preemption analysis, local regulation of condo-
minium conversions is absolutely barred. Under conflict analysis, on the other hand,
local regulation is possible so long as the local regulation does not conflict with state
statutes and policies. See also notes 247-252 and accompanying text infra.
229. Recently, one jurisdicton has had an opportunity to explore both the state
preemption and conflicting regulation issues. In Ciy ofMiami Beach . Rocio Corp.,
No. 80-626, slip. op. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 3rd Dist., April 7, 1981), an appellate court
affirmed a decision that struck down a local condominium conversion ordinance. The
ordinance contained a 90-day moratorium on conversions and provided an 18-month
lease extension provision. Id
In Rocio, the City of Miami appealed, arguing that the ordinance was neither pre-
empted by, nor.ih conflict with, the Florida Condominium Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 718.101-.622 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Specifically, the City claimed that absent ex-
press preemption by the legislature, under its Home Rule Powers, the city was free to
enact ordinances restricting conversions. The city further contended that its ordi-
nance merely supplemented the state condominium conversion regulations and was
thus a permissible municipal enactment. Id
The appellate court agreed with the City on the preemption issue. Construing the
Municipal Home Rule Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.021 (1979), the court noted that
absent express preemption by a Florida statute, the city could also regulate in an area
already regulated by the state. The court acknowledged that under traditional pre-
emption analysis, preemption could be implied from comprehensive state coverage of
the subject, but stated that the § 166.021(3)(c) required an express intent to preempt.
Id The court then examined the state condominium statute, and found nothing that
precluded a municipal exercise of power.
The court, however, did reject the City's claim that its ordinance supplemented the
state condominium law. Id Noting that an otherwise valid exercise of municipal
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original enabling legislation, devoid of conversion regulations.230
Thus, a party challenging a moratorium or other conversion regula-
tion on preemption grounds will probably fail.
2. Attacks on other sources of municipal regulatory power
Even absent a possible preemption argument, some litigants have
asserted that state law precludes municipal regulation of condomin-
ium conversion.23' These attacks focus on the statutory bases for
municipal attempts to include conversion activity under eviction con-
trol laws or prevent it through use of zoning powers and subdivision
control. These attacks have been somewhat successful, but, as with
use of the preemption doctrine, they have had only limited effective-
ness.
a. Land Use as a Method of Conversion Regulation
The earliest litigation involving condominium conversion regula-
power is invalid if in conflict with state law, the court proceeded to compare the state
and municipal conversion regulations. It noted, inter ala, that: 1) CrrY OF MIAMI
ORDINANCE No. 80-2197, which prohibited sales or conversions for 90 days, con-
flicted with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.402, which permits conversions; 2) CITY OF
MIAMI ORDINANCE No. 79-2169, § 17A-29, which provided that no tenancy could
expire later than 18 months after notice of conversion to the tenant, conflicted with
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.402(2)(A), which limited the tenancy expiration period to a
maximum of 180 days; and 3) CITY OF MIAMI ORDINANCE No. 79-2169, § 17A-30,
which prohibits cancellation of leases without 18 months' notice, conflicted with FLA.
STAT. ANN., which requires only 120 days' notice. Consequently, although the court
did not find preemption, it concluded the ordinance was improper because it con-
flicted with state mandates on the same issue. Id
In another interesting case, Bowndes . City of Glendale, 113 Cal. App. 3d 875; 170
Cal. Rptr. 342 (1980), a California appellate court also rejected a preemption argu-
ment. In Bowndes, a tenant challenged the validity of a local government action. The
Glendale City Council had approved applications to convert certain apartment build-
ings. The tenant sought mandamus to compel the city to set aside all approvals, con-
tending that the housing element of the local subdivision plan was inadequate and
thus inconsistent with the California Subdivision Map Act, CAL. GOV'T. CODE§§ 66410-66499.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), and that the local housing plan was also
inconsistent with, and preempted by, guidelines promulgated by the California Office
of Planning and Research pursuant to CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65040.2. The court re-
jected these arguments, finding that the local plan was specific enough and concluding
that there was no preemption because the guidelines did not have the effect of law. In
reaching these conclusions, the court stated that "[i]f the Legislature desires to pre-
empt the decision making power of local governments in the field [of conversions], it
should specifically say so." Id at 886, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
230. See note 208 supra.
23 1. See notes 228-258 and accompanying text infra.
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tion involved zoning and subdivision controls. Because state en-
abling acts omitted any discussion of the relationship between the
new condominium form of ownership and the emergence of condo-
minium conversions, 2 2 some tenants argued for manipulation of lo-
cal land use ordinances to protect their communities from
undesirable conversion activity.233 Such a restrictive use of land use
ordinances confficted with the state objective of encouraging condo-
minium development.234 Consequently, some courts precluded use
of planning legislation to prevent conversions, prohibiting cities and
towns from discriminating against the condominium form of owner-
ship.23
5
In Bridge Park Co. v. Highland Park, 36 one of the earliest cases
232. See notes 208-09 supra. While most states enacted enabling acts for condo-
minium ownership by the mid-1960's, most state level consideration of condominium
conversion has occurred in the last five years.
233. See, eg., City of Miami Beach v. Arlen King Cole Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,
302 So.2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (attempt to prevent conversion by claiming
change in type of ownership constituted nonconforming use); Maplewood Village
Tenants Ass'n v. Maplewood Village, 116 N.J. Super. 372, 282 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1971) (attempt to prohibit condominium conversion by applying subdivision
controls); Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super. 219, 273
A.2d 397 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (attempting to regulate conversions through
zoning powers); Gerber v. Town of Clarkstown, 78 Misc. 2d 221, 356 N.Y.S.2d 926
(1974) (denial of building permits to developer on basis that condominium is a subdi-
vision subject to planning board approval).
234. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
235. See notes 232-37 infra. One court, however, permitted a municipality to reg-
ulate condominium conversions through the use of zoning ordinances. In Goldman .
Town of Dennis, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1236, 375 N.E.2d 1212 (1980), the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts upheld a zoning bylaw that discriminated against condo-
minium ownership. The bylaw in question forbade the conversion of summer
cottages into year-round residences unless the building complied with the require-
ments for single-family dwellings.
Goldman can be harmonized with the cases prohibiting the use of zoning to regu-
late conversions. See note 229 supra. In the usual case, zoning was used merely to
prohibit a naked change of ownership form; there was no change in physical use of
the property. In Goldman, however, the change for periodic use to permanent use was
important. First, there are structural differences between summer residences and per-
manent homes, for example heating and insulation requirements. Second, there arc
growth considerations. Although a change of an apartment into a condominium does
not affect the demand for municipal resources, conversion of a temporary residence
into a permanent home may have a significant impact on density, schools, traffic and
the various resources available to the community.
For an argument that all conversion is a change of use, see Note, MunicipalRegula-
tion of Condominium Conversions in Caliornia, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 247-48 (1979).
236. 113 NJ. Super. 219, 273 A.2d 397 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
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addressing the land use issue, a New Jersey appellate court prevented
the defendant municipality from using a zoning ordinance to prohibit
conversion of garden apartments into condominiums. The court rea-
soned that although the state permitted municipal regulation of the
physical use and types of construction on real property, it did not
authorize municipalities to regulate ownership.237 Thus, without a
change of land use during the conversion process,238 the borough
could not regulate conversion in this manner.
Other courts encountering similar zoning restrictions on conver-
sion activity have followed the Bridge Park decision.239 Similarly,
courts have struck down municipal attempts to impair condominium
development through application of subdivision controls. 240 In light
of these decisions, most municipal regulations avoid the use of zoning
and subdivision controls.24 '
b. Implied Municigal Authority to Regulate Conversions
Several lawsuits have challenged the basic authority of municipali-
ties to regulate conversions. Those seeking to convert or purchase a
converted unit have argued that the local government exceeded its
power by enacting its particular conversion ordinance.24 2 They have
contended that the state did not empower the municipality to regu-
late conversions in the manner employed; thus, the municipal action
237. Id at 222, 273 A.2d at 399.
238. The court concluded that conversion of the building into a condominium
would not change the residential use of the building, and thus different zoning treat-
ment was improper. Id at 221-22, 273 A.2d at 398-99.
239. Eg., Arlen King Cole Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 302 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding that change in type of ownership, from hotel-apartment into
condominiums, does not destroy valid existing non-conforming use).
240. Eg., Maplewood Village Tenants Ass'n v. Maplewood Village, 116 N.J.
Super. 372, 282 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971) (holding that municipality could
not require subdivision approval for condominium conversion which conformed with
town zoning ordinances because state condominium statute provided that land use
restrictions be applied to use, not form of ownership). Cf. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66424
(West Supp. 1980) (considers condominiums subdivisions of land, and thus subject to
subdivision controls). For a discussion of California subdivision regulation of condo-
minium developments, see Comment, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums:
Social and Economic Regulations Under the Caifornia Subdivision Map Act, 16 CAL.
W. L. REv. 466 (1980). See also Note, Municipal Regulation of Condominium Conver-
sions in Calfornia, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 230-31 (1979).
241. See notes 139-207 and accompanying text supra.
242. See notes 240-271 and 292-94 and accompanying text infra.
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was ultra vires.243
The evolution of such challenges can best be examined by analyz-
ing the responses of one jurisdiction. In Massachusetts, the Supreme
Judicial Court has considered three separate attacks on the source of
municipal power to regulate conversions. In the earliest case, Zuss-
man v. Rent Control Board,2' a landlord-convertor sued after the
rent control board of the Town of Brookline denied him the certifi-
cates of eviction to which he was entitled. The landlord had com-
plied with the original "guidelines" promulgated by the board to
regulate conversions. Before he received the certificates, however,
the local board, in an effort to protect the town's elderly citizens, is-
sued additional "Emergency Regulations" under the state's general
rent control statute.245 The Supreme Judicial Court found that the
243. An ultra vires act by a municipality is defined as a municipal action that goes
beyond the powers converred upon it by state law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365
(5th ed. 1979).
In cases challenging condominium conversions, the term ultra vires has not been
used. Generally, the issue arises implicitly. For example, in El Patio v. Permanent
Rent Control Bd., 110 Cal. App. 3d 915, 168 Cal. Rptr.'276 (1980), the court struck
down a municipal action that attempted to impose additional conditions on a devel-
oper after he complied with state law. This action was ultra vires.
The developer in El Patio had properly obtained approval of a tentative subdivi-
sion map for a condominium conversion, meeting certain state law requirements.
Thereafter, the voters in the City of Santa Monica approved a rent control charter
amendment regulating conversions. Pursuant to the charter amendment, the devel-
oper requested a vested right waiver by the rent control board, which would permit
him to continue his conversion free of the ordinance restrictions. Before the board
considered his application, it amended its rules regarding vested rights in a manner
prohibitive of the developer's conversion. Subsequently, the board denied the devel-
oper a vested right determination. In ElPatio, the court found the local government
had acted improperly. It held, therefore, "that the City could not impose additional
conditions after the conditional approval of the tentative map." Id at 927, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 283. Here, a direct conflict existed between the state law requirements and
the local restrictions. The city sought to act beyond the scope of its authority.
244. 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975).
245. Id. at 563, 326 N.E.2d at 877. The "Emergency Regulations," promulgated
on January 30, 1973 by the Brookline rent control board, provided that condominium
conversion alone was no longer "just cause" for conversion. Before these regulations,
a landlord wishing to convert his building need only apply for certificates of eviction
in order to remove his building from rent control. Following enactment of the
"Emergency Regulations," new, more severe restrictions were imposed:
1) a limitation on the annual cost of the condominium; 2) a surety bond for
management and maintenance of the condominium; 3) purchase and sale
agreements signed for at least fifty-one percent of all units in the building; and
4) such other requirements as the Board deems necessary according to the cir-
cumstances of each case.
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"Emergency Regulations" were unreasonable in that they prevented
condominium conversions. 24" Moreover, the court noted that the
regulations were, in effect, ultra vires because they did not further the
objectives of the state rent control act; they were not authorized by
the statute and they conflicted with the statutory policy of encourag-
ing condominium ownership.' 7 The court, however, in holding for
the landlord, did not preclude use of rent control mechanisms to pro-
tect tenants.
After Zussman undermined the Town of Brookline's efforts to pro-
tect its elderly, the town revoked its acceptance of the Massachusetts
general rent control statute.248 Instead, it began regulating rents and
evictions pursuant to a special rent control statute enacted by the
state legislature for it alone.249 The special statute permitted Brook-
line to establish its own eviction controls through by-laws.250 There-
after, the town used by-law amendments to inhibit condominium
conversion. 51
In Grace v. Town of Brookline, a developer, a unit owner, and a
potential condominium purchaser challenged the validity of the by-
laws and amendments.253 The disputed by-laws rendered certificates
of eviction unavailable to developers, but provided that unit purchas-
ers, subject to certain limitations, could obtain them.254 The plain-
Id at 568, 326 N.E.2d at 880. See also Note, Government Regulation of Condominium
Conversion, 8 B.C. ENV. A1F. L. REV. 919, 929-32 (1980).
246. 367 Mass. at 568, 326 N.E.2d at 880.
247. Id at 566-67, 326 N.E.2d at 878-79. The court construed the Massachusetts
Rent Control Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 842 [term extended by MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. c. 360 (1974) (no longer in force as of December 31, 1975)] (1970) and
found that Brookline's regulations conflicted with several provisions of the Act that
encouraged home ownership. Id at 566, 326 N.E.2d at 878. Thus, under the state's
general rent control statute, Brookline lacked authority to regulate conversions
through use of that statute.
248. See Grace v. Town of Brookline, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1039-40 (Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct. 1979). See also Note, Government Regulation of Condominium Conversion, 8 B.C.
ENV. AFF. L. REv. 919, 932 (1980).
249. See Grace v. Town of Brookline, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1039-40 (Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct. 1979). The new statute specifically granted Brookline the power to enact rent
controls. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 843, 1970 Mass. Acts 740.
250. 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1039-40.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1038.
253. Id at 1039.
254. Id at 1040, n.8. The amended provision in dispute provided:
Section 9. Evictions a) no person shall bring any action to recover possession of
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tiffs argued, in part, that the by-laws were inconsistent with state law
under Zussman, and that the town exceeded the scope of delegation
intended by the legislature in enacting the special rent control stat-
ute." The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected these
arguments. The court distinguished Zussman, noting that the special
enabling legislation authorized Brookline to act in accordance with
its own housing problems. 5 6 Thus, the town had not exceeded its
delegated authority by restricting conversions. In addition, the court
compared the statute at issue in Zussman with the special legislation
involved in Grace. The court found that the policy of encouraging
home ownership present in the Zussman general statute was absent in
the special act." It therefore concluded that the by-laws in Grace
were not inconsistent with the neutral state enabling act.258 The
court upheld the Brookline regulations as a proper exercise of the
municipality's police power.259
Both Zussman and Grace challenged the source of a municipality's
legal power to regulate condominium conversions. Neither case
clearly analyzed the relationship between a municipality's control
powers and its use of those powers in condominium regulation. The
a controlled rental unit unless: 8) the landlord seeks to recover possession in
good faith for use and occupancy of himself or his children, parents, brother,
sister, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law except that f
the unit is a condominium unit occupied by a tenant who was in possession thereof at
the time the landlordrequired ownership, then the Board shall not issue a Certicate
of Eviction hereunderfor a period of six months from the date when the Board
determines that thefacts attested to in the Landlord's Petition are valid and in com-
pliance herewith; andif the Board determines that a hardshp exists, then the Board
may extend theperiod between the determination of validity and compliance hereun-
der and the datefor issuance of/the Certfcatefor an additionalperiod of up to six
months. 10) The landlord seeks to recover possession for any other just cause,
provided that his purpose is not in conflict with the provisions and purposes of
this act. The submission of a unit to Chapter 183,4 of the General Laws of Massa-
chusetts [the state condominium statute] shall not be deemed just cause hereunder.
(Emphasis indicated language added pursuant to amendment).
255. Id at 1042. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that Brookline's special rent con-
trol statute was functionally the same as the state's general rent control statutes. They
reasoned that since Zussman struck down the Brookline "Emergency Regulations" as
conflicting with the statutory policy of encouraging home ownership, the new amend-
ments under the special statute should also fail. See also notes 242-43 supra and
accompanying text.
256. 399 N.E.2d at 1042.
257. Id at 1043.
258. Id at 1042-43.
259. Id at 1043.
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Supreme Judicial Court, in Flynn v. City of Cambridge,6 ' directly
addressed this relationship and confirmed the municipality's implicit
power to regulate conversions.
In Flynn, the plaintiffs contested the legal power and authority of
the Cambridge city council to enact an ordinance regulating condo-
minium conversion through eviction controls. 261 The city had en-
acted the ordinance pursuant to its home rule powers and a special
state rent control statute which authorized it to regulate its rental
housing.262 The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the ordinance. 263 It
found that the special statute implicitly authorized the city to enact
the challenged regulation. 2' Under the court's reasoning, the special
statute's express grant of power to protect tenants "carrie[d] with it all
the unexpressed, incidental powers necessary to carry it into ef-
fect."' 265 To conclude otherwise, stated the court, would have under-
mined the special rent control statute.266 The court, therefore, held
that the power to control removals, and thus regulate conversions,
was incidental to rent control.
267
c. Home Rule as a Source of Municipal Power to Regulate
While the Supreme Judicial Court in Flynn resolved the problem
of determining the source of municipal power to regulate in Massa-
chusetts, it expressly avoided the "home rule" issue.268 For many
challengers to condominium regulation, whether or not a municipal-
ity has home rule powers is crucial. Most localities do not regulate
260. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sb. 692, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981).
261. Id at 693, 418 N.E.2d at 335-36. Like Brookline, the City of Cambridge
received a special grant of power to regulate rents by the state legislature. Id at 694-
95,418 N.E.2d at 336-37. The special statute, 1976 Mass. Acts c. 36, authorized Cam-
bridge to control rents and evictions. Further, section 5(c) of c. 36 permitted the City
"to regulate the removal of controlled rental housing units from the market." 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 695, 418 N.E.2d at 337. Additionally, this particular statute ex-
pressly addressed the problem of condominium conversion.
262. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE No. 929 (March 3, 1980).
263. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 693, 418 N.E.2d at 336.
264. Id at 695, 418 N.E.2d at 338.
265. Id at 698, 418 N.E.2d at 338. The court found an implied power "to regu-
late the removal of rental housing stock from the market. . . ." Id This implied
power was an unexpressed grant of power to the City to carry out the purposes the
special rent control act.
266. Id at 699, 418 N.E.2d at 338.
267. Id at 699, 418 N.E.2d at 338.
268. Id at 695, 418 N.E.2d at 337.
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conversions through state authorized eviction controls; rather, they
enact independent ordinances to deal with their local problems.269
To promulgate such ordinances, municipalities require a source of
power. Most localities have based their regulation on home rule acts
and the police powers derived thereunder.27 0 The question, then, is
whether home rule power is a legitimate basis for conversion con-
trols.
A major home rule challenge arose in the District of Columbia
following passage by its governing council of several successive
ninety-day moratoria on condominium conversions.271 By using its
emergency home rule powers, the council circumvented the more
stringent legislative process provided by Congress for the enactment
269. See notes 13 and 144-211 and accompanying text supra.
270. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., No. 80-626, slip op. (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App., 3rd Dist., April 7, 1981), (finding that Miami could regulate conversions
under its home rule powers absent state preemption in the field, or a conflict between
municipal and state laws). Cf. National Association of Realtors Newsletter, Condo-
minium Conversion Update, at 1 (February 1, 1980) (noting an unreported case strik-
ing down a Glen Ellyn, Illinois conversion ordinance because the town was a non-
home rule town, and was therefore without authority to act).
Home Rule is the source of municipal power for local initiatives. One basic defini-
tion of home rule is that:
[m]unicipal home rule in its broadest sense means the power of local self-
government. Any power of local self-government, therefore, in whatever manner
arising, whether inherent as sometimes claimed, or conferred or recognized by
constitutional or statutory grant, or powers emanating from the people of the
local community themselves and set forth in a charter authorized by the state
organic law, would be included. The phrase is usually associated with powers
vested in cities and towns by constitutional or statutory provisions, particularly
the former, and more especially organic authorization to the local inhabitants to
frame and adopt their own municipal charters. Rights thus emanating by consti-
tutional grant are viewed as constitutional rights protected from invasion or in-
terference by the people of the state in their representative legislative capacity.
Cities and towns having constitutional, freeholders or home-rule charters, in the-
ory at least, derive their power of local self-government from the state constitu-
tion.
I E. McQUiLLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.41 (3d ed. 1971) (foot-
note omitted).
271. District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415
A.2d 1349, 1350 (D.C. 1980). The District of Columbia council had passed three
emergency ordinances to prohibit conversion. D.C. Act 3-44, 25 D.C. Reg. 10363
(1979) (ef4 May 29, 1979); D.C. Act 3-95, 26 D.C. Reg. 1014 (1979) (eff. Aug. 27,
1979); and D.C. Act 1-132, 26 D.C. Reg. 2436 (1979) (eff. Nov. 23, 1979). See also,
Note, The Regulation of.Rental Apartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507,
520-23 (1980).
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of regular legislation.272 In effect, the council gave the emergency
regulations the effect of permanent legislation banning condominium
conversions.273
In District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownershil Council,
Inc. (WHOC),274 the plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion to invalidate the emergency legislation. The trial court ruled for
the plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of the then effective emergency
regulation.275 On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed.2 76 The appellate court held that the council did not have
authority "to pass another substantially identical emergency act in
response to the same emergency.277 The court construed the Dis-
trict's Home Rule Act2 78 and concluded that the emergency power
was "not an alternative legislative track" to enacting permanent legis-
lation.279 It therefore found that the council had exceeded its home
rule powers.280
WHOC suggests that home rule attacks will not meet much suc-
cess. The court of appeals upheld the declaratory judgment only be-
cause of the method chosen by the council, not because of the nature
of the legislation itself. One can infer, therefore, that home rule
power could be a proper basis for municipal regulation of condomin-
272. District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415
A.2d 1349, 1353 (D.C. 1980). Congress delegated part of its legislative power to the
District, and created a standard procedure for the District of Columbia council to
promulgate and pass legislation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-146 (Supp. VI 1979). Under
these procedures, to enact permanent legislation, the council may pass legislation by
majority vote after two readings, a minimum of 13 days apart. Id § 1-146(a). Then,
if the passed legislation withstands a mayoral veto (or the council overrides the veto),
the act becomes effective after 30 days of Congressional review. Id §§ 1-144(e)-
147(c)(1).
In contrast, Congress empowered the council to pass emergency legislation by vote
of two-thirds of the members if the circumstances require it. Id § 146(a). Only one
reading is necessary, but the legislation has effectiveness for only ninety days. Id
273. District of Columbia v. Washington Home Ownership Council, Inc., 415
A.2d 1349, 1353-54 (D.C. 1980).
274. 415 A.2d 1349 (D.C. 1980).
275. Id at 1350. See also id at 1353, citing Washington Home Ownership Coun-
cil, Inc., 107 Wash. D.L. Reptr. 1985 (Nov. 9, 1979).
276. 415 A.2d at 1350.
277. Id at 1359.
278. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-146(a) (West Supp. 1979).
279. 415 A.2d at 1359.
280. Id at 1359-60.
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ium conversion.281
B. Constitutional Challenges to Conversion Regulations
Along with state law claims, many litigants have challenged con-
version ordinances on constitutional grounds. The underlying ra-
tionale is that conversion ordinances severely infringe upon the rights
of property owners. Generally, the constitutional attacks have been
based upon due process and equal protection grounds. Some com-
mentators have argued that litigants could also bring challenges
based upon impairment of contract28 2 and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority.283 None of the arguments have met with much
281. See note 261 supra.
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contract Clause prohibits states from
enacting laws that materially alter contractual relationships. E.g., Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Thus, developers and owners challenging
a conversion ordinance might argue that such regulation impinges upon their freedom
of contract by interfering with their ability to sell rental units, and altering their ex-
isting landlord-tenant relationships. In fact, such an argument was suggested in only
one case, Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, 490 F. Supp. 706, 708 (D.
N.J. 1980). The Claridge House court, however, never addressed this issue, deciding
the case on other grounds. See notes 215-16 supra.
Two student commentators have correctly noted that Contract Clause argument is
not terribly troublesome for a municipality. The courts do not apply this clause rig-
idly. Rather, application of the Contract Clause is limited by valid exercises of state
police powers. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
In addition, until United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the
Supreme Court had not invalidated an economic or social regulation in forty years.
Id at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Then, following United States Trust, the Court
reasserted its aversion to Contract Clause challenges, restating the principle that the
Clause can not preempt a state's police power protection interests. Allied Structural
Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 240. See also Comment, The Regulation of Rental
A4partment Conversion, 8 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 507, 526 n. 117 (1980); Note, The Valid-
ity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Conversion, 78 MICH. L. REv. 124, 127 n. 19
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Validity of Ordinances].
283. One student writer has advanced an argument that some conversion ordi-
nances are unlawful delegations of legislative authority. Validity of Ordinances, supra
note 282, at 135-41.
This argument focuses on the tenant consent provisions of some statutes. The
writer asserts that such statutes, requiring tenant consent before an owner may con-
vert his building, unlawfully provides tenants with the alternate power to decide on
conversions; thus the legislature arguably has abrogated its duty.
While the delegation argument is somewhat persuasive, as a practical matter, courts
will probably reject it. When the legislature enacted the tenant consent provision, it
made the legislative judgment regarding conversions. Conversions are possible, but
only if the landlord strikes a bargain with his present tenants. Thus tenant consent
merely waives the ban against conversion, and allows the developer an opportunity to
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success in either state or federal courts.284
1. Due Process
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process challenges have
been the most successful constitutional challenges to local conversion
regulation.285 The due process arguments have taken three forms.
The first argument is that a statute is unconstitutionally vague in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.2 6 Al-
though this argument is useful, a litigant's victory might be short-
lived; the ordinance may be unconstitutional as written, but there is
nothing preventing the municipality from drafting another supersed-
ing ordinance. The second argument is based upon a municipality's
exercise of its police power and tests whether the exercise was proper
and reasonable. If it is not, the municipality has violated due pro-
cess. 28 7 The third due process argument involves the restrictive na-
ture of conversion regulations. Litigants have argued that a
restrictive municipal conversion regulation constitutes a "taking" of
property, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment.28 Although less successful than the others, this contention is
more intriguing because many regulations interfere substantially with
the rights of the landlord and the unit purchaser.
a. Vagueness
Two recent cases, Chicago Real Estate Board, Inc. v. City of Chi-
cago28 9 and Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona,290 have
convert when he ordinarily could not. E.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917). Accord, Note, Munic#pal Regulation of Condominium Con-
versions in California, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 257-58 (1979).
284. See note 285-348 and accompanying text infra.
285. See notes 279-290 and accompanying text infra.
286. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See notes 279-
290 and accompanying text i./ra.
287. See notes 292-94 and accompanying text infra.
288. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Additionally, all state constitutions have analogous, if not iden-
tical, due process provisions. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; MASS. CONST. art. X, Pt.
I; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26. See notes 296-320 and accompanying text infra.
289. No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. April 3, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunc-
tion), reprinted in ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY MATERIALS-LAND USE LITIGATION
469 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ALI-ABA MATERIALS].
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considered whether a local conversion ordinance was so vague as to
be in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In Chicago RealEstate Board, the plaintiffs291 sought to enjoin'
enforcement of a forty-day moratorium prohibiting conversion in
buildings with thirty or more rental units.2 92 Plaintiffs charged, inter
alia, that the city arbitrarily exercised its police power,29' exceeded
its home rule authority,294 and violated plaintiff's due process rights
because the statute was void for vagueness. 295 A federal district court
granted a preliminary injunction, finding the statute impermissibly
vague.296 The court noted that "[w]e do not know precisely when a
person contemplating conversion of a rental unit building would find
himself under the authority of the ordinance .... [T]he ordinance
does not make this clear. ' 297 The case was never tried on the merits.
290. 490 F. Supp. 706 (D. N.J. 1980).
291. Plaintiffs included property owners, property managers, and real estate bro-
kers. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at I, Chicago Real Estate Board, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 79 C 1284 (N.D. IM. April 3, 1979), reprinted in ALI-ABA MATERIALS, at
431.
292. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 100.2-11 (enacted March 21, 1979).
293. In its six-count amended complaint, plaintiffs argued that: 1) the language
of the ordinance was so vague that landowners could not determine what activity was
prohibited, and thus violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
2) the ordinance constituted an impermissible restraint of alienation under the Four-
teenth Amendment by improperly regulating the choice of ownership and not its use;
3) the conversion of the form of ownership does not pose a danger to city, thus the
ordinance was arbitrary and capricious, denying landowners equal protection under
the law; 4) the ordinance was arbitrary and capricious because it distinguished be-
tween buildings containing thirty or more units from other buildings without a ra-
tional basis, thus denying plaintiffs equal protection under the law; 5) the city
exceeded its home rule powers in regulating a form of ownership which the state
already regulates; and 6) the municipal ordinance violated a state statute which re-
quires that newly enacted penalty provisions become enforceable no sooner than ten
days after publication. See ALI-ABA MATERIALS, at 432-46.
294. See note 293 supra.
295. Under the void for vagueness doctrine, a statute need not be absolutely clear.
It must, however, be sufficiently understandable. Persons must be able to conduct
themselves in a manner which will not subject them to liability. Therefore, if a statute
is "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
. .. [the statute] violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1976). The "void for vagueness" standard is well-
settled in constitutional law. Eg., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
296. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 7, Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of
Chicago (N.D. 111. April 20, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction) reprinted in
ALI-ABA MATERIALS at 475.
297. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 5, Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of
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In Claridge House One, plaintiffs... brought similar constitutional
challenges to the federal courts. 2 9 9 The Borough of Verona had en-
acted a one-year moratorium on the conversion of any rental unit
into a condominium. A building owner contended that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague since he could not determine what
steps, if any, he could undertake in the conversion process without
violating the ordinance."° ° The district court judge indicated he con-
curred with the plaintiffs' assessment of the ordinance, but instead
avoided the constitutional question by striking down the moratorium
on state grounds.30 ' This case is in line with the general principle of
avoiding constitutional issues wherever possible.3
0 2
b. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law
The second due process claim, that the municipality unreasonably
exercised its police power depriving owners of property rights with-
out due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, is even less
Chicago (N.D. I11. April 3, 1979) (order granting temporary restraining order); ALl-
ABA MATERIALS at 458. Judge McGarr incorporated these remarks into his order
granting the preliminary injunction. See Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 5, Chi-
cago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago, (N.D. M11. April 20, 1979) (order granting
preliminary injunction); reprinted in ALI-ABA MATERIALS at 473.
298. Plaintiffs were a corporation, which had purchased a luxury apartment
building for the purpose of converting it into condominiums, and Anthony Fer-
ragame, a tenant of the building who wished to purchase his apartment as a condo-
minium unit. 490 F. Supp. at 708.
299. In this declaratory judgment suit, the plaintiffs alleged that Verona's ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally vague, deprived plaintiffs of their property without due
process of law; violated their equal protection rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment, and impaired their freedom of contract rights. Id at 707-08. These arguments
are nearly identical to those advanced by the plaintiffs in Chicago Real Estate Board,
note 283 supra.
300. 490 F. Supp. at 708. Plaintiff noted that converting apartment buildings in-
volves approximately nine different steps. Cf Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 4,
Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago, No. 79C-1284, (N.D. IM. April 2, 1979)
(complaint seeking injunction) (Count I challenged the ordinance as vague, noting
nine steps in the conversion process from the formulaion of plans to convert to the
final sale of individual units); reprinted in ALI-ABA MATERIALS at 434.
301. District Judge Lacey expressed his concern about the constitutionality of the
conversion ordinance, finding the plaintiffs' claims not frivolous. 490 F. Supp. at 708-
09. Nevertheless, he decided the case on state preemption grounds. Id at 713. See
notes 215-16 and accompanying text supra.
302. E.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959).
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likely to aid litigants. 303 Challengers relying upon this argument
have asserted that the conversion regulation was arbitrary and with-
out proper legislative purpose3' because it merely regulated a form
of ownership. These contentions are easily disposed of. First, munic-
ipalities enact conversion ordinances in response to critical housing
situations, usually precipitated by a sharp drop in available rental
housing.30 5 The purpose behind the legislation is clearly proper be-
303. See notes 304-06 and accompanying text infra.
304. See, e.g., Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, 490 F. Supp. 706,
708-09 (D. NJ. 1980) (arguing that the ordinance unlawfully deprived plaintiff of his
property without due process because the City's exercise of police power merely af-
fects the form of ownership); Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 7, Chicago Real
Estate Board v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill., filed April 2, 1979), re-
printedin ALI-ABA MATERIALS, note 289, supra, at 437 (arguing that an ordinance
regulating the form of ownership, invading the right to acquire and dispose of prop-
erty, and restraining alienation deprives plaintiff of the due process under the four-
teenth amendment); Collins v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 3d 463, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (1981) (arguing that denial of approval for conversion by city agency with-
out sufficient findings for basis of decision denies plaintiff due process).
Collins v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 3d 463, 172 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1981), can
be classified as a procedural due process case, as distinguished from the substantive
due process cases, Claridge House and Chicago Real Estate Board Collins does not
focus the propriety of the municipal conversion ordinance as a valid excuse of police
power. Rather, the Collins decision focuses on the deficiencies of the method by
which the municipality implemented the ordinance. 172 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
In Collins, the plaintiffs, pursuant to Los Angeles conversion ordinance, applied
with the proper local agency for approval to convert an apartment building into a
condominium. Id The City Council denied the application. In disapproving this
application, the Council failed to make adequate findings regarding the basis for its
decision. Id at 177. The council concluded that the building as a condominium
conversion would require more parking spaces than as an apartment building, but
provided no explanation for this result. Consequently, the court found the council
decision inadequate, stating:
[Since] we are here dealing with the constitutionally protected right of private prop-
erty (CaL Const., art. I, § 1 and art. I, § 19) and an exercise of the police power by the
City which impinges on that right by denying to the owner a use of the property
which would otherwise be perfectly legal and proper, we subject the City's findings to
a stricter scrutiny than might be the case where approval had been granted. Id at
178.
The court reversed the trial court decision upholding the City Council Action. It
ordered the trial court to issue a writ of mandate directing the Council to rehear the
matter and make adequate findings. Id
305. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 9-1201(l)-(8) (1979) (noting through its
legislative findings that: 1) the building owners are experiencing high costs; 2) es-
calatory property values lead to high profits; 3) costs of purchasing converted units
often greatly exceed rental fees for same unit; 4) conversion can lead to displacement
of tenants; 5) apartment renters did not anticipate nor were they warned of conver-
sions; 6) finding comparable rental housing is burdensome on tenants; 7) tenants
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cause it attempts to control one of the principal contributors to the
rental housing shortage.s Further, the enactment is not arbitrary,
as the municipality's police powers are particularly useful in mitigat-
ing such problems. For these reasons, such a due process attack must
inevitably fail.
c. The Taking Argument
Perhaps the most persuasive attack on a condominium conversion
ordinance is that it operates to deprive property owners of their prop-
erty without just compensation, in violation of due process.30 7 This
attack, otherwise known as the "taking" argument,30 8 pits the police
powers vested in a municipality to protect public interests against the
private ownership interests of an individual.3 1 In regulating conver-
need relief under the circumstances; and 8) the City may enact such regulations
under its police power to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens).
306. The test applied by courts under these circumstances is the rational basis test.
Under this test, the municipality need only show that the legislators had a rational
basis for the regulation. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 389
(1926). To do so, the municipality must establish that it: 1) adopted the regulation
for a legitimate purpose; 2) that the regulation is necessary to reach that goal; and
3) that the regulation is not unduly burdensome. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894).
Conversion regulations are analogous to land use and rent control regulations, as
they all interfere with the rights of the property owner under the rubric of police
power. The latter regulations are almost always upheld by courts if they meet the
rational basis test. Cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962)
(upholding a zoning ordinance that deprives property owner of his property's benefi-
cial use) and Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (upholding a
housing regulation during a housing shortage although the ordinance interfered with
the property rights of the buiding owner). See generally Comment, The Regulation of
Rental Apartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 530-34 (1980); Validity of
Ordinance.r, supra note 272, at 128-32. See also Snyderman & Morrison, supra note
11, for an excellent discussion of the constitutional issues raised by conversion
moratoriums.
307. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."
308. For a general discussion of the "taking" argument, see Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Pro-
cess, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980).
309. The relationship between the police power and eminent domain should be
considered on a sliding scale. The police power permits public interference with pri-
vate rights to a good extent. See notes 131-138 supra and accompanying text. Such
interference requires no compensation. When, however, the restrictions on the indi-
vidual increase, constitutional safeguards come into play. Thus, for example, if a
landowner's rights in his property are impaired and nearly evaporate through the
state's exercise of police power, he may be entitled to compensation because his land
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sions, municipalities clearly interfere with the rights of property own-
ers to use and dispose of their property in the manner in which they
desire. The question is whether the regulation results in a defacto
"taking" of the owner's building, in effect, by use of eminent domain.
Thus far, no federal or state appellate court has found such a tak-
ing,3 10 and only federal judges continue to suggest that a plaintiff
might prevail on the "taking" theory. 1'
The crux of the taking argument is that application of the condo-
minium conversion regulation directly takes property from a building
owner through reallocating the property interests of tenants and land-
lords and prohibiting the landlord from removing his building from
the rental market. An analogous argument has been made by unit
purchasers denied access to their units because tenants still reside
therein. Both arguments focus on the regulation's effects upon prop-
erty owners rather than on the form of the ordinance itself.
Proponents of the taking argument have been unsuccessful. In
probably the strongest due process case considered by any court, a
federal district court in Chan v. Town of Brookline312 denied the
plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to prohibit municipal
enforcement of a conversion ordinance. The plaintiff, a purchaser of
a rental unit, was denied a certificate of eviction from the town rent
control board.313 Under the local eviction control ordinance, it was
may be taken for the public good; the greater amount of state regulation for the public
benefit, the closer such regulation comes to ousting the owner. There is no bright-line
test for determining what amount of regulation constitutes a taking.
310. Even the earliest trial court decisions would not specifically adapt the taking
theory. See, e.g., Rothman v. Borough of Fort Lee, No. L 21679-73 P.W. (Super. Ct.
Bergen County, N.J. June 14, 1974) (striking down conversion ordinance as being
unconstitutionally vague and an abridgement of the rights of the apartment building
owner). See also Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem: Causes and Solu-
tions, 1980 DUKE L. REv. 306, 325; Validi y of Ordinances, note 272 supra, at 127
n.18, for further discussion of Rothman.
311. Two District Judges, Lacey and McNaught, have suggested that the conver-
sion ordinances challenged in their respective cases might result in a taking. In Clar-
idge House, supra, Judge Lacey noted "plaintiff's taking without just compensation
claim [can not] be disregarded as completely without merit." 490 F. Supp. at 708.
Similarly, Judge McNaught found "[tihe Chans may be deprived of the use of their
property permanently. This may be more than simply regulating the use of property.
It may constitute redistribution of it-a restriction of such nature that it amounts to a
taking without just compensation." Chan v. Town of Brookline, 484 F. Supp. 1283,
1286 (D. Mass. 1980). See also notes 300-306 infra and accompanying text.
312. 484 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Mass. 1980).
313. Id at 1284.
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possible he might never receive possession of his property unless the
tenant voluntarily vacated.314 The court noted that the permanence
of the ban may have constituted a taking without compensation.315
Nevertheless, it withheld the requested relief to prevent harm to the
municipality's tenants316 until the case could be heard on the mer-
its.3" 7 Thereafter, the case became moot because the tenant va-
cated.31 8
In Fynn v. City of Cambridge,3 19 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts rejected the due process implications raised by the fed-
eral court in Chan. In Flnn, the court upheld a regulation granting
the Cambridge rent control board power to prohibit removal of any
controlled unit unless the city rental vacancy rate exceeded four per-
cent.320 The ordinance precluded condominium unit purchasers
from obtaining possession of their units if they were used for rental
housing on the effective date of the ordinance.321
Condominium purchasers challenged the ordinance, arguing that
its enforcement amounted to a taking without just compensation.322
The court repudiated this contention. The opinion stated that: 1)
those who purchase units after the effective date "are on notice they
have no right to use their property as owner-occupied housing; '
323
and 2) those who purchased, but did not occupy their units before the
effective date, will not "establish a 'taking' by showing that they have
been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they hereto-
fore had believed was available .... ,32 Relying heavily on Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,325 the court con-
314. Id at 1286.
315. Id
316. Id at 1287.
317. Id
318. Telephone conversation with an unnamed assistant district court clerk on
May 6, 1980.
319. 81 Mass. Adv. Sh. 692, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981).
320. ld at 693, 418 N.E.2d at 336.
321. ld at 699-700, 418 N.E.2d at 339.
322. Id at 699, 418 N.E.2d at 339.
323. Id at 700, 418 N.E.2d at 339.
324. Id
325. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central is the most important recent Supreme
Court decision considering the relationship between the police power and the "tak-
ing" of property from a private owner. In that case, the Court upheld a New York
City commission decision, pursuant to a local landmark preservation ordinance, re-
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cluded that the owners' interests were not so impaired as to constitute
a taking because they could still obtain fair rental value for their
properties.3 26
The Fovnn court went well beyond all other courts regarding the
taking issue. Under its analysis, a conversion regulation, no matter
how severe and restrictive, could never result in a taking of property
so long as the owners receive some benefit from their property. The
opinion perhaps took Penn Central too far when it included unit pur-
chasers who bought their condominiums before enactment of the
challenged ordinance.3 27 On the other hand, Flynn is consistent with
jecting a plan to construct an office building on Grand Central Station. Although
conceding that enforcement of the regulation had a severe economic impact on the
property, diminishing its value, the Court found no "taking." The Court adhered to
its traditional position that government could not function if it had to compensate a
property owner for every interference caused by changes in general laws. Id at 124.
Thus, Penn Central reinterated the Supreme Court's reluctance to afford constitu-
tional protection to real property interests, absent an actual physical invasion of prop-
erty by government. Id
In Penn Central, the Court again recognized the difficulties of resolving the "tak-
ing" issue. Consequently, cases concerning the "taking" issue have been subject to
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Id Nevertheless, the Court provided some
analytical framework for deciding whether a government regulation affected a "tak-
ing" of private property. The Court noted two major factors:
1) whether the government action interfered with the owner's "primary expectation"
concerning the use of his property; and 2) whether the owner would still obtain a
reasonable return on its investment. Id at 136. Applying these factors to Penn Cen.
tral, the Court concluded the owner still could continue the property's original and
primary use as a railroad terminal and thereby receive a reasonable return on his
investment. Id See generally Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915). See also Michelman, Property, Utility andFarness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck, Police Power, Tak-
ings, andDue Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057 (1980); Comment, Regulation of
Land Use: From Magna Carta to a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 904 (1977).
For a general discussion of Penn Central as it relates to condominium conversions, see
Note, Government Regulation of Condominium Conversion, 8 B.C. ENv. AFF. L. Rnv.
919, 938-40 (1980); Comment, The Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversions, 8
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 535 (1980); Validity of Ordinances, note 282, supra, 134-35;
Comment, The Legality and Practicality of Condominium Conversion Moratoriums, 34
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1199, 1215-16 (1980).
326. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 701, 418 N.E.2d at 340.
327. See notes 325-26 supra. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted
the two key factors discussed in Penn Central, namely the property owner's expec-
tancy and whether he would still receive a reasonable rate of return on his property.
Nevertheless, the Rlynn court seemed to flout these factors. The court apparently
relied heavily on the reasonable rate of return language of Penn Central, and virtually
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recent zoning cases like Agins v. City of Tiburon32 which upheld a
zoning ordinance against a challenge by a property owner whose
financial interests in his land were adversely affected by a subsequent
regulation.329 Thus, fynn may stand as the landmark case in this
area. While other state courts may not accept or follow its rationale,
the Flynn decision would probably survive review by the United
States Supreme Court.
2. Equal Protection
Some property owners have also argued that municipal conversion
regulations deny them equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.330 These owners contend that the local regulations cre-
ate classifications of property owners that arbitrarily discriminate
ignored the property owner's expectancy. The Flynn court did not distinguish be-
tween condominium unit purchasers who bought for investment purposes and other
unit purchasers who bought their units for residential purposes. Clearly, the latter
group would not receive their expectancy, and would not be adequately compensated
for their loss. The purchaser who bought for residential purposes, before the enact-
ment of the ordinance, had his property "taken" if the Penn Central factors were
literally and rigorously applied. Still, in light of the United States Supreme Court's
reluctance to find a "taking" absent a physical invasion of the property by govern-
ment, the Flynn court's reliance on the rate of return factors probably resulted in a
correct constitutional resolution of the problem, despite the extraordinary hardship
suffered by some unit purchasers.
328. 447 U.S. 255.
329. Id at 261.
330. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in part
that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which ... den[ies] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id See, e.g., Claridge House
One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, 490 F. Supp. 706 (1980) (raising an equal protection
argument the court found was not frivolous; case decided, however, on state grounds);
Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 1284 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1979)
(order granting temporary restraining order) reprinted in ALI-ABA MATERIALS at pg.
460-61 (noting two potential equal protection violations: I) whether an ordinance
that applies only to buildings with 30 or more apartment units is arbitrary; and
2) whether ordinance distinctions between buildings built as condominiums and
buildings be converted to condominiums are arbitrary). See also Green Hill Con-
cerned Tenants Ass'n v. Green Hill Venture, No. 810567 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 12,
1981); River Parks Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. 3600 Venture, No. 810566 (E.D. Pa., filed
Feb. 12. 1981). These cases are challenging portions of the Pennsylvania condomin-
ium law that are based on the Uniform Condominium Act. The equal protection
challenge focuses on a part of the Pennsylvania statute that provides an extended
notice period for persons over 62 years of age or older, who have occupied the unit for
more than two years. 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3410 (Purdon 1980). The plaintiffs
argue that the distinction between those persons who have resided for less than two
years in the apartment building and other residents is arbitrary. Telephone interview
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against and single out rental buiding owners from other owners.
Some courts have responded rather summarily to these equal protec-
tion claims,331 always denying relief.332 Applying the "rational ba-
sis" test,333 they have found the municipal ordinances rationally
related to some legitimate governmental interest. 334 The decisions
comport with the general judicial tendency to allow legislatures wide
latitude in remedying social problems.335
In Grace v. Town of Brookline,336 the only state supreme court case
to consider an equal protection claim, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts preemptorily disposed of the challenge.337 The court
noted that classification by form of ownership could be rationally re-
lated to the purposes of rent and eviction control.338 It then deter-
with Jack M. Bernard of Philadelphia, Pa., attorney for the plaintiffs in both suits
(May 15, 1981).
331. See notes 318-26 and accompanying text infra.
332. No case, in any court, federal or state, has sustained the challenge of a con-
dominium conversion ordinance on equal protection grounds.
333. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 4112,4112 (1981);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). The United States Supreme Court
applies the rational basis test as the standard of review for equal protection challenges
concerning economic interests. Applying this test, a court determines whether the
legislative classification at issue is rationally related to the legitimate statutory objec-
tives. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4113. In the case of condominium conversion ordinances,
under the rational basis test, the question will be whether the classification, usually
singling out apartment building owners, is rationally related to the objectives of pro-
tecting the low-income persons and the elderly from displacement and providing ade-
quate rental housing. It is unnecessary that the method chosen by the legislature be
the best means available. In addition, there is no equal protection violation if the
challenged regulation addressed only part of the problem. New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). A conversion regulation will be upheld if it is rationally
related to the objective of providing adequate housing.
334. See notes 338-40 and accompanying text infra.
335. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1980), 693-704. The au-
thor suggests that the courts give legislatures deferential review of economic and so-
cial legislation. Specifically, under the rationality standard, the court requires little
factual data to support a legislative classification. Thus, short of proving that the
legislative facts relied on by the governmental decisionmaker could not be true, a
litigant challenging a legislative classification will inevitably fail. See also Claridge
House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona, 490 F. Supp. 706, 709 (1980).
336. 399 N.E. 2d 1038 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1979).
337. Id at 1046.
338. Id at 1046. The court rejected the plaintiffs-property owners contention that
classifications based solely on property ownership, rather than use, were improper.
The plaintiffs advanced this argument on the basis of cases that prohibited different
zoning treatment for condominiums. See notes 228-38 supra and accompanying text.
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mined that the Brookline by-law regulating conversion advanced the
purposes of rent and eviction control, and thus was rationally related
to the town's legitimate interest in providing housing for its eld-
erly.339 The court upheld the regulation, holding that the legislature
could rationally single out condominium conversion as a particular
threat to rent and eviction control.34°
The Grace rationale was followed in the New York case of Reiner-
Kaiser Associates v. McConnachie.34' In Reiner-Kaiser, a landlord
brought a holdover proceeding to evict an elderly tenant. One issue
raised by the proceeding was whether the senior citizen exemption in
the state conversion ordinance denied the landlord equal protec-
tion.342 The court upheld the ordinance, finding that the law was not
arbitrary and capricious. 343 Holding that the legislation served the
rational interest of protecting the elderly during a housing shortage,
the court concluded that the resulting discrepancies in treatment of
certain property owners did not deny them equal protection.344 It
did, however, evict the tenant since the statute was inapplicable to the
particular circumstances.345
The Grace court, however, distinguished the zoning cases from the instant case, not-
ing that none of these cases considered conversion regulation through eviction con-
trols, nor rested their conclusions on the equal protection clause. Id
339. Id at 1047. The court found that the challenged regulation did further the
purposes of rent and eviction controls. The Town of Brookline imposed these con-
trols to protect its large elderly population. See generally, Note, Government Regula-
tion of Condominium Conversion, 8 B.C. ENv. AFF. L. REv. 919 (1980). See also
Note, Condominium Conversion Legislatior Limitation on Use or Deprivation of
Rights?-4 Re-Examination ofRights, 15 NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 815, 833-34 (1980). For
an extensive discussion of the equal protection clause challenge to condominium con-
versoin ordinances see, C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE & P. AsCH, MUNICIPALITIES AND
MULTIPLE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING: CONDOMINIUMS AND RENT CONTROL 65-71
(1976).
340. 399 N.E.2d at 1047.
341. 104 Misc. 2d 750, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (Cn. Ct. N.Y. Queens Cty. 1979).
342. Id at 749, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45. The landlord argued that the State of
New York unconstitutionally exercised its police power when it enacted a senior citi-
zen exemption which prohibited the eviction of any tenant, 62 years old or older, from
an apartment that is being converted, if the tenant earns less than $30,000 per year.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee (McKinney Supp. 1979). The landlord contended
that the statute violated the equal protection clause because its purpose was to protect
a particular class rather than the general public.
343. 429 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
344. Id
345. Id at 346. The court found that the challenged statute was not applicable to
this particular defendant. Although Ms. McConnachie met the statutory require-
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Equal protection challenges, along with other constitutional
claims,346 will prove of little value to developers, landlords, and unit
purchasers. Although the legal arguments have some merit, courts
probably will find conversion regulations rationally related to the
problems of tenant displacement and preservation of rental housing
stocks. Discrimination against converters is not invidious if the legis-
lature can justify its classifications as furthering the legislative pur-
pose.347 Additionally, while courts recognize that these regulations
frequently interfere with the usual owner-tenant and owner-buyer re-
lationships, they will be sustained because they do not totally deprive
the owner of all uses of his property.348 For the most part, therefore,
conversion regulations will withstand constitutional challenges ex-
cept when they are poorly drafted or obviously arbitrary.
VI. ANALYSIS
Analysis of the condominium conversion problem requires that
one premise be kept in mind: the underlying objective of govern-
ment, at all levels, must be to provide enough desirable rental hous-
ing. The critical problem is not condominium conversions; rather, it
is the shortage of affordable rental housing.
Present state and local regulations of condominium conversions
have serious shortcomings. First, many of the ordinances are merely
stop-gap provisions, effective only in the short run. 34 9 These regula-
tions benefit present tenants but will provide little protection for
other tenants in the future. Second, local ordinances and state stat-
utes are enacted without the necessary coordination between the
communities affected by conversions and other levels of govern-
ment.350 Lack of coordination between state and local governments
ments, she was denied protection because the landlord filed his conversion plans
before passage of the legislation. Id at 345-46. Thus, the landlord prevailed in the
holdover proceeding to oust the tenant for possession.
346. See notes 272-316 supra.
347. See notes 307-28 and accompanying text supra.
348. See notes 207-28 and accompanying text supra.
349. See notes 139-191 and accompanying text supra. The stop-gap provisions
are merely fingers in the leaky dike. These provisions do not emphasize development
of new housing. They merely regulate or in some cases prohibit conversions. See
also Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem: Causes and Solutions, 1980
DuKE LJ. 306.
350. As previously noted, cities created most conversion ordinances because the
state government failed to act. See notes 11-13 supra. Now, however, a number of
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often weakens local regulations by creating policy conflicts. Third,
regulations at both levels have imposed greater threats upon develop-
ers, further restricting private housing development and exacerbating
the housing shortage. Adequate condominium conversion regulation
requires cooperation between the various levels of government, as
there is no single solution to the problem.
Most conversion regulations also are insufficient because they fail
to address the basic problem. In enacting regulations, both states and
municipalities have protected tenants in varying degrees.35' While
the regulations mitigate the hardships on tenants, and in some in-
stances preserve rental housing, most often they are counterproduc-
tive. Like rent controls, they discourage building maintenance,
inner-city rehabilitation, and new construction.
Any ordinance regulating condominium conversion, however, is
better than none at all. Cities like Houston, Texas, with uncontrolled
growth, soon will face substantial problems adequately housing their
low- and moderate-income residents.352 It is abundantly clear, there-
states have responded to the conversion problem and have enacted specific legislation.
Nevertheless, many state statutes on conversion illustrate tremendous insensitivity to
the conversion problems of the cities because they provide only a minimum of protec-
tion for tenants. Winer, Housing Law Con erted by Condomania, Nat'l. L.., May 18,
1981, at 24. Consequently, many municipalities have attempted to co-regulate con-
versions. Ritter, Condominium Conversions: A City Attorney's View, 55 FLA. B.J. 94
(1981). Such co-regulation has often resulted in court battles.
Only a few states have attempted to coordinate conversion regulations. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 66411 (West Supp. 1979) (delegating some power of conversion regu-
lation to cities); MINN. STAT. ANN.. § 515A.1-106(c) (West 1980) (permitting cities the
power to enact legislation to resolve significant problems). Yet even these states have
not otherwise developed and implemented national housing policies to resolve the
conversion crisis. This problem has been exacerbated by the recent passing of Propo-
sition 13 in California, Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts, and other initiatives seek-
ing to limit state spending.
The lack of coordination between governments includes the federal level. The fed-
eral government thus far has failed to enact either any direct conversion legislation or
any tax revisions which could aid in dealing with the conversion problems, although
it has investigated both areas. The result is often a confusing morass or contradictory
regulations, or an absence of adequate regulation altogether.
351. See notes 139-206 and accompanying text supra.
352. Telephone discussion with an associate city planner in Houston, Texas on
March 3, 1980. The planner disclosed that the only conversion regulation is by en-
forcement of building codes. Consequently, conversion activity is essentially un-
checked. Further, to date, the City had not undertaken to study the conversion
activities and their effects.
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fore, conversions must be regulated until other solutions for the gen-
eral housing crisis can be found.
Present governmental solutions, though inadequate, must not be
merely discarded in a deregulatory fervor. It is true local regulation
of condominium conversions follows a piecemeal approach by the
governmental level least equipped to solve the entire problem. Lo-
calities, however, must retain the power to regulate conversions be-
cause they are best able to resolve the specific individualized housing
problems of their respective communities. It is also essential that
state governments take a more active role in condominium conver-
sion regulation. They must work more closely with their cities.353
The state has greater resources available, and can develop and imple-
ment a more comprehensive housing policy. Such an approach has
been adopted in California 4 and Minnesota.355
353. The drafters of both the Uniform Condominium Act and the Model Condo-
minium Code have suggested that conversion regulation be restricted to the state
level. The rationale for this suggestion is that localities may subvert the state policy of
encouraging desirable conversion activity. See Comment, The Condominium Conver-
sion Problenr Causes and Solutions, 1980 DUKE L.J. 306, 328-29 (1980).
These drafters are incorrect; conversion activities should be regulated by cities as
well. First, cities will not undermine conversion activities where appropriate. Con-
versions are beneficial to cities in terms of urban renewal and a broader tax base.
Thus, whenever possible, cities would probably permit conversion. Second, as a prac-
tical matter, state regulation has failed miserably. Most state regulations have loop-
holes which have permitted injurious conversion activity, resulting in tenant
displacement of the elderly, in particular. Consequently, even with comprehensive
state condominium regulations, many municipalities have attempted to co-regulate.
Such co-regulation is symptomatic of inadequate state protection. See notes 213-232
supra and accompanying text. Compare Ritter, Condominium Conversion: A CiO , t-
torney's View, 51 FLA. B.J. 94 (1981) with Mursten, Florida's Regulatory Response to
Condominium Conversions: The Roth Act, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1077 (1980). The
Ritter article criticizes the Florida Condominium Act and the courts because they
preclude municipal conversion controls. He notes that the state protection has been
ineffective in protecting many residents. In contrast, the Mursten article praises the
state conversion ordinance. Mursten notes that the statute is not entirely comprehen-
sive, but offers greater protection than ever before for Florida residents.
354. CAL. GovT CODE §§ 66410-66499.37 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. Bus. RES.
CODE § 30600 (West Supp. 1979). See generally J. Soloway, Condos, Co-ops, and Con-
versions: A Guide on Rental Conversions for Local Officials, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH (Nov. 1979); Comment, Conversion of4part.
ments to Condominiums: Social and Economic Regulations Under the California Subdi-
vision Map Act, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 466 (1980); Note, Municioal Regulation of
Condominium Conversions in Californla, 53 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 225 (1979).
355. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 515A1-101 to 515A.4-118 (West 1980). Both the Min-
nesota and California Statutes expressly permit state regulation and contemplate
some coordination between governmental levels.
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By regulating condominium conversions through statutes and ordi-
nances, states and municipalities have dealt with only half the prob-
lem. Each level of government must develop incentives for new
rental housing construction because even when the conversion boom
subsides, a shortage of rental housing will still exist. Local govern-
ments, for example, could encourage developers by giving them pre-
ferred zoning treatment.356 Moreover, both states and municipalities
could aid developers through financial assistance programs. Such
programs could consist of low-interest loans, local Industrial Devel-
opment Bond financing,357 or other state funds targeted for develop-
ment of low- and moderate-income housing. These and other
legislative incentives may promote new housing construction.
Despite the efforts of state and local governments, federal govern-
ment involvement may be necessary. The federal government can
stimulate rental housing construction through financing programs
and tax incentives for builders. Federal financing through insured
low-interest government loans could be used to leverage private capi-
tal, promoting private development. Tax incentives, such as special
credits and special, larger depreciation allowances, may once again358
make rental construction profitable. As it stands now, returns on
356. A grant of preferred zoning treatment would require only that the municipal-
ity provide developers who agree to building rental housing with special use permits,
zoning variances, and so on. Considering the scarcity of city land, such permits are
very desirable.
357. See, e.g., Kane & Belkin, Financing Commercial Developments in Illinois by
the Use of Various Forms of Municopal Bonds, 29 DE PAUL L. Rav. 1009 (1980). In
this article, the authors have noted that private real estate developers have encoun-
tered numerous difficulties in obtaining conventional financing for their ventures.
Consequently, alternative forms of financing must become available. The authors
have suggested that local governments participate in financing new developments
through various forms of bond financing. Their analysis, which usually applies to
commercial developments, could be altered to apply to housing ventures. While there
is no guarantee that such financing would be successful (because housing has not been
traditionally as lucrative as other developments), bond financing is certainly worthy
of consideration.
358. Investment tax credit is designed to foster capital investment in new person-
alty to create a more efficient capital plant. The grant of tax credit is found in I.R.C.
§ 48 and refers to applicable property that is found in Section 38. I.R.C. § 38. Thus it
is frequently referred to as "Section 38 Property." Generally, Section 38 Property is
personalty, although energy-related tax credits permit credits for items that are not
personalty. Id. For a general review of Investment Tax Credit see M. Levine,
WEST'S HANDBOOK SERIES: REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, TAX PLANNING 294-307
(1976).
In the mid-1970's historic preservationists were successful in convincing Congress
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rental housing are so low as compared with similar condominium
to incorporate tax credits for "qualified rehabilitation expenditures" for a "qualified
rehabilitated building." I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)(E). In the instance of historic preservation,
these credits may be used in conjunction with accelerated depreciation. Thus the
credits further encourage developers to preserve historic properties by providing them
with a faster write-off due to the credits and accelerated depreciation.
Investment tax credits have been most recently made available for the promotion of
energy conservation. For example, business may take investment tax credit on cate-
gories of energy property that are treated as Section 38 property. They are alternative
energy property (boilers, burners, equipment for producing synthetic fuel, equipment
to convert coal [including lignite] or any unmarketable substance derived therefrom
into petroleum or natural gas derived feedstock) wind or solar energy property, spe-
cifically designed energy property (designed to reduce energy consumption) in ex-
isting commercial and industrial processes, shale oil equipment, recycling equipment,
equipment for producing natural gas from geopressured brine, and equipment to con-
vert ocean thermal energy to usable energy. I.R.C. § 48(l)(3)(A). Qualified hydroe-
lectric generating property, congeneration equipment, and qualified intercity buses
also may use the tax credit. I.R.C. § 48(l)(2)(A). The credit available varies from 10-
15%. I.R.C. § 48(l). If the improvements are financed by tax-exempt bonds, the
credit is reduced by one-half. I.R.C. § 48(l)(1 1). If the energy credit is for tangible
personal property, both credits may be utilized. Thus, a taxpayer might achieve a
twenty-five percent credit for certain business investments.
The credit is much more niggardly with respect to personal residences. A taxpayer
may claim income tax credit for energy-saving and renewable energy source equip-
ment purchased with respect to principal residence after April 19, 1977 and before
1986. I.R.C. § 53. The maximum credit for energy-conserving equipment is $300.
I.R.C. § 44(b)(1). A separate credit of up to $4,000 is available for the installation of
certain renewable energy source equipment such as solar, wind, or geo-thermal en-
ergy systems. I.R.C. § 44(b)(2).
Through the growing use of such credits, there is clearly precedent for creating
necessary capital to finance new construction by tax credit inducements. Rental hous-
ing starts, especially in multi-family housing units, have fallen off dramatically in
recent years. Congress could avail itself of the tax credit to encourage entrepreneurs
to invest in middle-income multi-family housing.
To further spur this housing creation Congress could also repeal the recapture of
accelerated depreciation that was taken in the construction of qualified middle-in-
come housing as is currently the practice with qualified low-income housing. See
I.R.C. § 1250. The yield to investors could be further increased by the repeal of the
minimum and maximum taxes on accelerated depreciation taken with respect to mid-
dle-income housing construction. These minimum and maximum taxes have virtu-
ally eliminated the use of accelerated depreciation by investors. For an analysis of
these taxes see generally Willis & Rabbe, Imposition f Minimum Tax Eliminates Ad-
vantages of Accelerated Depreciation in Most Cases, 55 TAXES 368 (1977) and O'Neill,
Changes in the Minimum and Maximum Taxes Have Broad Impact Especially on Shel-
ters, 46 J. TAX. 22 (1977). The repeal of these taxes would produce a greater shelter
for middle-income housing and greater investment would follow.
Thus there are substantial federal tax pools that could be employed to promote
multi-family housing. The construction of such housing would enhance the housing
market and relieve the intense pressure to convert the existing multi-family housing
stock to condominiums.
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developments, builders will always opt for the latter. Disincentives to
convert, in other words, will only further injure the already dismal
housing market. Favorable treatment of rental housing is necessary;
a failure to promote private construction and rehabilitation of rental
housing will result in government landlords.
VII. CONCLUSION
The increase in condominium conversions has highlighted the
United States' rental housing crisis. The conversion problem itself is
a result of that crisis. While conversions have had many positive ef-
fects on cities, they also have caused hardships for elderly and low-
and moderate-income tenants. State and local governments have re-
sponded by regulating conversions in order to halt depletion of rental
housing supplies. For the most part, these government measures
have operated to protect tenants and hinder converters. Still, the cri-
sis is not over. Federal, state, and local governments have not re-
sponded to the entire housing problem. Under President Reagan's
administration, the federal government probably will not make the
necessary financing available to developers. Even so, developers will
receive better tax treatment, encouraging more building, though
probably not in rental housing. Presently, the conversion problem
has abated because high interest rates have limited financing of con-
struction and purchases. However, when the interest rate drops, the
problem will reemerge. Something must be done.
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